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VOL.76, NO. 4, 2014

GETTING IN POSITION

HOW TO COVER ALL
THE GROUND IN A
CRITICAL INCIDENT

MONCTON IN FOCUS
SOCIAL MEDIA KEY TO CRISIS
COMMUNICATION P.7

BOSTON STRONG
LESSONS FROM THE MARATHON
BOMBINGS P.14

MODELLING CALM
POLICE RESPONSE CAN HELP
COMMUNITIES COPE P.24

FITNESS FOR DUTY
FOCUSED WORKOUTS IDEAL FOR
TIME-STRAPPED OFFICERS P.30

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COVER SECTION

- 7 Social media connects RCMP to public during crisis
- 10 Camp assesses suitability for ERT course
- 11 Bringing medical support inside a tactical environment
- 12 Panel Discussion: How can police forces best recover after a crisis or disaster?
- 14 Lessons from the Boston marathon bombing
- 17 System bolsters collaboration during disasters
- 18 San Francisco's tool for disaster management
- 20 Many issues to consider in pandemic planning and response
- 22 Mindfulness training helps police remain resilient
- 24 Understanding trauma and the role of police in recovery



DEPARTMENTS

- 4 Editorial message
- 5 News Notes
- 26 Just the Facts: School violence
- 27 Ask an Expert: Dr. Mark Sandercock sheds light on arson analysis
- 28 Featured Submission: Embedding criminologists in police departments
- 30 Featured Submission: Designer workouts to keep officers fit
- 32 On the Leading Edge
- 34 Emerging Trends: Missing children's program puts info into public's hands





WHEN THERE'S NO WARNING



Once in a while, *Gazette* magazine's editorial team works on an issue that, despite being planned many months ahead, becomes highly topical.

As we were finalizing this issue on how police prepare for and respond to serious unexpected incidents, the active shooter incident in downtown Ottawa, Ont., began to unfold, and our cover theme became eerily timely. It became clear that front-line members who are well trained to go into these situations were being put to the test once again.

For this issue, we explore the many factors at play when police officers respond to critical events such as the incident on Parliament Hill last October.

For our cover article, Deidre Seiden looks back at another violent event — the June 4 Moncton shootings in which three of our members were killed, and two were injured. The simple, but effective approach taken by the RCMP communications team in New Brunswick was to make sure that, in the minutes and hours after the deadly shootings when the suspect was still at large, the public received timely and accurate information to stay safe. And for those still doubting its relevance to police work, social media was key.

Seiden also writes about a training camp in Ottawa that tests and prepares police officers who want to join the RCMP's Emergency Response Teams (ERT). The camp throws physical and mental challenges at each participant to assess how they respond under stress, work with others and draw upon the right skills and mindset to make an operation succeed.

Going into these uncertain situations is potentially dangerous. We also look at two approaches to providing emergency medical support to specialty teams such as ERT. The OPP's Tactical Emergency Medical Service uses highly skilled paramedics to provide advanced medical care to its tactical troops, while the RCMP's Emergency Medical

Response Teams use police medics in active operations where local EMS can't enter. While different, both approaches ensure critical care when and where needed.

Sometimes, looking back at a crisis can shed light on how to plan for the next one. Herman B. Leonard of the Harvard Kennedy School shares law enforcement lessons from the 2013 Boston marathon bombings. One of the many take-aways from his insightful piece is that large-scale joint operations for planned events can prove tremendously beneficial for responding to more random incidents.

We also look at what police and other first responders are doing to plan for natural disasters.

The San Francisco Department of Emergency Management has developed an online crisis map that provides live updates and real-time feeds to the public during an emergency.

In Norway, researchers are developing technical solutions to ensure multi-agency interoperability during a large-scale emergency such as a disaster.

Finally, critical incidents such as these are not just physically demanding, but emotionally taxing.

The Hillsboro Police Department is helping its members develop resiliency to trauma through mindfulness-based stress reduction. This awareness training, also used by the U.S. Marines, is a preventive rather than reactive intervention, and science shows it works.

And J. Kevin Cameron of the Canadian Centre for Threat Assessment and Trauma Response reminds police officers about the healthy ways of dealing with trauma both for themselves and the communities they serve.

There's no one approach to preparing for the next crisis or disaster, but sharing all the tools and practices available today is a step in the right direction. ■

— Katherine Aldred
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GAZETTE

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TRANSLATION: RCMP Translation Services

PRINTING: St. Joseph Communications

The *Gazette* (ISSN 1196-6513) is published in English and French by the National Communication Services of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in Ottawa. The views expressed in any material published in the magazine or in its online version are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Cover design and contents are copyrighted and no part of this publication may be reproduced without written consent. Canada Post Publications Mail Agreement 40064068. The *Gazette* is published four (4) times a year and is issued free of charge on a limited basis to accredited police forces and agencies within the criminal justice system. Personal subscriptions are not available.

The *Gazette* welcomes contributions, letters, articles and comments in either official language. We reserve the right to edit for length, content and clarity. © 2014 RCMP

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ON THE COVER:

Police officers take cover behind their vehicles in Moncton, N.B. during the shootings last June. An open approach to communication by police during the crisis helped reassure the public.
Photo: Daniel St Louis



ONLINE MENTORING PROGRAM HELPS NORTHERN YOUTH

When S/Sgt. Grant MacDonald saw an opportunity to combine three of his passions — policing, youth and the North — as a volunteer for the DreamCatcher Mentoring (DCM) program, he took it.

MacDonald is an e-mentor for DCM, an online career mentoring program that connects young people in northern communities with e-mentors across Canada working in their dream career. The program started about 10 years ago to tackle the high rate of high school dropouts in the territories, and recently became a part of Big Brothers Big Sisters of Canada.

"A lot of these places are very difficult to deliver services to," says Claire Smith, the program manager. "This is a cool way of reaching across some of the boundaries within Canada."

Smith says a lot of young people have good ideas and see a positive future, but they're not exactly sure how to get there. The program aims to make that connection and empower northern youth to create goals, stay

in school and plan for their futures by having a one-on-one relationship with an e-mentor.

Since 2009, DCM has matched MacDonald with students in Grade 9 to 12 interested in policing. He's required to spend about 10 to 30 minutes a week responding to his students' questions.

But he often goes beyond that, taking the time to not only answer their questions fully, but to find out about them and challenge them to find out information about the RCMP.

"It's a good way to engage them in a way they're accustomed to, and by digging, they'll explore the RCMP website and discover interesting facts about the organization," says MacDonald.

With so many students in the North interested in hands-on careers like policing, there's always a need for e-mentors like MacDonald.

"As a police officer, we're role models for our youth," says MacDonald. "They're the most precious natural resource we have and this is a tremendous opportunity to make



As an e-mentor for the DreamCatcher Mentoring program, S/Sgt. Grant MacDonald gets to combine his passion for youth, policing and the North.

the difference in the life of a northern youth by helping them decide if a career in policing is the right fit for them." ■

— Deidre Seiden

'OLD' FORENSIC TECHNOLOGY SEES RESURGENCE

What's old is new again at the RCMP, at least when it comes to Vacuum Metal Deposition (VMD), technology that recovers fingerprints.

"The technology has been there and it's always been very good, but it's expensive," says Dr. Della Wilkinson of the Integrated Forensic Identification Services (IFIS). "What we're seeing now as a result of the polymer banknotes being introduced into Canadian circulation is a resurgence of interest in VMD."

VMD is a very sensitive instrument that creates a vacuum in a chamber, allowing metal to vaporize and adhere to fingerprint residue on non-porous and semi-porous surfaces like plastic, firearms and even tight-weave fabrics.

It's not technology that you jump into without having good reason to, says Wilkinson. But because IFIS has proven through research that VMD works very well on polymer banknotes, they're hoping to procure three new machines, in addition to the one the RCMP already has, that will service all RCMP forensic identification services across Canada.



Vacuum Metal Deposition technology has excellent results developing fingerprints on the new Canadian polymer banknotes.

The technology is far more sensitive than traditional methods of fingerprint development like the superglue dyeing technique. But it doesn't have to be one or the other; they can be used in sequence.

VMD can recover fingerprints from the dirtiest of exhibits as well as exhibits that have been submerged in water or have been sitting for years in an evidence locker.

"It's been extremely successful in recovering fingerprints on a number of cold cases where traditional techniques have failed," says C/Supt. Bill Fordy, the officer in charge

of Surrey Detachment.

Knowing the benefits of the technology, Fordy has been making a case to bring the technology to his detachment.

"We all watch CSI," says Fordy. "The public's perception is that we can do things in an hour. Well, this technology is actually in alignment with that. Within 15 minutes, we can develop fingerprints. We'll be able to identify offenders quickly and eliminate others equally efficiently." ■

— Deidre Seiden



CALL BACK UNIT IMPROVES POLICE RESPONSE

Three years ago, borrowing the idea from the Halifax District Detachment, the RCMP in New Brunswick started up a Call Back Unit, in Dieppe, N.B.

The unit started with three police officers — a number that has now grown to nine — who respond to calls for service that don't require an immediate, in-person police response, like minor motor vehicle accidents, gas drive-offs and general inquiries.

"We receive a lot of calls from the public, and the more you can filter those calls that can be handled through other means, the better off you're going to be," says C/Supt. Wayne Gallant, the criminal operations officer for the RCMP in New Brunswick.

The unit returns as much as 20 per cent of incoming calls, providing clients with an efficient, in-depth service. The team has even identified several crime patterns, which they've alerted investigators to for further investigation or charges.

The Call Back Unit comprises duty-to-accommodate members, who are medically unable to perform front-line duties. Sgt. Jennifer Carroll-Johnston, the non-commissioned officer in charge of the unit, says creating meaningful work for these members has allowed them to put their extensive policing experience and skills to work again, as well as have regular



The RCMP in New Brunswick's Telephone Response Teams will be receiving all calls that went to the detachment directly in order to triage them.

client contact.

"We get a lot of feedback from members about how grateful they are for solving a lot of these minor issues because the clients are getting attention that maybe they wouldn't if members were tied up and busy, and more importantly, it frees up their time so they can focus on priority matters or self-generated files," says Carroll-Johnston.

Last year, following a core services review, senior managers decided to build on the program. It's now in the process of launching three Telephone Response Units, each made up of three regular members and

three public service employees (PSEs).

The PSEs will receive all calls for service that would have gone to the detachment directly, so they'll be able to triage them, further alleviating the workload of both front-line members and detachment clerks.

"This is a huge call-management success," says Gallant. "When people say, 'What are you doing to take work away from the front line?' Well, we've got this tangible 20 per cent they were previously getting that we can point to."

— Sigrid Forberg

LEADERSHIP PROGRAM PUTS YOUTH ON RIGHT TRACK

A leadership program based out of the high school in Arviat, Nunavut, is teaching young people lessons that fall outside the standard curriculum.

"The goals of the program are fairly large," says Ross Paterson, one of the two co-ordinators of the Arviat Leadership Resiliency Program (LRP). "Our open-ended goal down the road would be to see a community with a greater kind of self-confidence and pride, lower cases of domestic and spousal violence and decreased crime rates."

Paterson and Amanda McLaughlin, LRP's other co-ordinator, work out of John Arnalukjuak High School, where they oversee groups of youth, sorted by age, through a one-year cycle of community service, physical activity and coping strategies for everything from daily challenges

to real crises.

Youth can either self-refer themselves to the program, or different agencies in the community, including the RCMP, social services or school staff, will refer them for the program.

The participants are encouraged to view LRP as a safe space where they can push themselves to deal with things that fall outside of their emotional or physical comfort zones to gain skills and confidence and develop protective factors.

With nearly half of the community's population under the age of 18, Paterson and McLaughlin are hopeful that, in the long term, those protective factors will help tackle the number of issues Arviat's youth face, ranging from suicide, unhealthy relationships and substance abuse. For now, the

participants' enthusiasm is encouraging.

"We've had a few graduates actually come back and be a part of the program as it continues to run," says McLaughlin. "A few of them actually took a really big interest in that so we're trying to engage and involve them as much as we can in a peer leadership role."

They add the support from the local RCMP has been especially helpful. Paterson and McLaughlin often call in members to help run activities, do presentations or just to be a positive presence in uniform.

"We've had wonderful support from the RCMP," says Paterson. "They've been a much more visible kind of presence over those last three years and we've just been reaping the benefits of that."

— Sigrid Forberg



During the Moncton shootings last June and in the days leading up to and after the funeral, RCMP in New Brunswick kept their lines of communication open with the public, continually posting information to social media and following the conversation online.

#RCMPFALLEN3

SOCIAL MEDIA CONNECTS RCMP TO PUBLIC DURING CRISIS

By Deidre Seiden

On June 4, 2014, at 7:20 p.m. in Moncton, N.B., the RCMP Codiac Regional Detachment received a call that an armed man dressed in camouflage was walking through a residential neighbourhood. It was the beginning of a crisis that sparked a 30-hour lockdown as police hunted for a man who killed three RCMP officers and injured two others.

Almost immediately, the public took to social media — Twitter and Facebook — describing what they were seeing, everything from police vehicles racing down their street to an image of a then-unknown suspect wearing fatigues and carrying two rifles to a video of a woman witnessing gunfire from her house.

It was on social media that RCMP communications strategist Alex Vass first heard about the shooter.

TARGETED COMMUNICATIONS

Vass called into work and, after making ar-

rangements to bring his daughter to a friend's house, he arrived at Codiac Detachment just before 9 p.m.

Social media was already engaged and rumours were circulating. It was clear to Vass and the communications team that the RCMP needed to get accurate information about the situation into the public's hands right away.

"We had an idea of what we were dealing with, but the only thing that was on our minds at the time was that we had an active shooter out there somewhere in a residential area so the key is to get people to stay in and stay away from that area," says Vass.

Using traditional media to immediately get the word out wasn't the best option. The local television news was in between broadcasts, the local radio station wasn't live at the time and the area newspaper was behind a paywall so not everyone had access to its digital version.

"Social media was just the way to go,"

says Vass. "It allowed us to get out and communicate directly to citizens."

It was a quick and easy way for the communications team to not only put the message out, but to have control over it.

EASING TENSION

With the world watching, the communications around the incident needed to be timely and accurate, and it had to say something.

The team made sure that the messages had a call to action, asking people to do something like stay inside and leave the porch light on.

The first tweet was posted about two hours after the initial call. The small team continued to post a new message on average every 30 minutes for the next 12 hours.

"Throughout the night, there was still information we needed to get out," says Paul Greene, the Director of Communications for the RCMP in New Brunswick. "We wanted



to get out things like a map of the area that was cordoned off. If you're in that area, stay in your homes and don't answer the door."

Each tweet and Facebook post was brand new — even if the information didn't change. The idea of posting new messages was to reassure people that if they were sitting in their basement, and a lot of people were, the RCMP was still there with them.

"That seemed to reassure people," says Greene. "And what we noticed as well was the rumours stopped on social media. People were going to our site. So if people were saying something else, others were going, 'Hang on, the RCMP didn't say that.' Then they would point back to us. We were the credible source of information."

TOUGH DECISIONS

In the immediate aftermath of the shootings, every message that was sent out was co-ordinated by the communications team, including Vass and Media Relations Officer Cst. Damien Theriault on the ground in Moncton, and Greene at the headquarters in Fredericton with Insp. Dave Vautour.

Vautour was acting as the incident commander for the first few hours of the shooting and, as such, was the delegator and the decision maker. Every few minutes, Vass would approach Vautour with what they wanted to send out.

"At the time, it was one of those events

that you couldn't imagine because of the phone calls and text messages and the people who were showing up and arriving, we were being inundated from all angles," says Vautour.

As the night progressed, the team had to make some tough decisions about what information to share with the public. Two of the biggest decisions Vautour had to make were whether or not to identify the shooter and whether they should confirm the number of members killed and injured.

Vautour says he relied on Vass and the team's expertise, and in the end, decided to share both pieces of information.

"I knew I was taking a risk putting that information out, but I also knew it was the right thing to do," says Vautour. "If I have to worry about whether I'm going to get sued because I released information or I have to keep the public safe, I'm going to err on the side of keeping the public safe, which is what I fell back on in making that decision."

Not all of the decisions on what to reveal were difficult ones. They focused on public safety and police safety. When the RCMP noticed members of the public were posting on social media the whereabouts of active police officers, they asked them not to, saying it could be dangerous. They didn't know if the suspect was following on social media.

When someone asked the RCMP on Facebook if it would be helpful if they turned

their porch light on, Theriault agreed that it would help the operation and that became a part of their regular message, with the public and media taking up the movement.

TRUSTED NEWS SOURCE

The detachment was getting hundreds of calls from media all over the world. No sooner did they listen to one message from a media outlet, than there would be ten more in its place. The media picked up on what the RCMP was saying on social media, using screen shots of their tweets on their websites and in their broadcasts.

"We were a very small team in the middle of a crisis," says Greene. "This was the best way to get the information out."

Only a few interviews were given during the crisis and these were chosen strategically to reach the residents of Moncton to keep them informed of the situation.

People were waiting for and relying on the RCMP for the information, often not trusting what they were hearing until it was confirmed by the RCMP.

"When the shooter was arrested and social media lit up with the fact that he had been arrested, there were a lot of people who commented that they were waiting until they heard the official word from the RCMP," says Vass.

For the duration of the lockdown and the days leading up to and after the funeral, RCMP in New Brunswick kept their lines of communication open, continually posting information to social media and following the conversation online. In this way, they were able to answer questions coming from the media and the public.

After the funerals, their inbox was flooded with questions and requests for interviews about Danny the police dog. He struck a chord with people when, at the funeral, he stood on his hind legs to sniff his late partner, Cst. Dave Ross, Stetson.

The communications team responded by writing a news release about Danny's future. They visited Danny and recorded a video of him playing in a creek that they uploaded on YouTube and linked to in the press release. The video has more than 100,000 views. They were able to get that information without doing conventional interviews.

BUILDING A FOLLOWING

Using social media effectively was not an accident for the team. Since 2010, they've had a plan in place.

"Since we got into social media, the plan

People were waiting for and relying on the RCMP for the information, often times not trusting what they were hearing until it was confirmed by the RCMP.



Daniel St Louis



INVESTIGATORS USE NEW VIDEO UPLOAD TOOL

In a first for the RCMP, investigators of the June 4 Moncton shootings used an online tool that allowed the public to anonymously upload images and videos relevant to the case, to a secure RCMP website.

When canvassing the neighbourhood for videos and images, investigators quickly realized that people were reluctant to give up their mobile phones and computers to police. There was a belief they'd have to give up their device for an extended period of time and some were concerned about their privacy.

"We felt that if we developed a tool like this, the public would be less reluctant to share the images online," says Sgt. Mark Janes, the team commander on the file. "We thought we probably weren't getting everything and believed that we could get more if we came up with this tool."

They sent a request for technical assistance. The RCMP's National Communication Services' New Media team, the Chief Information Officer sector and Shared Services Canada worked together

to develop the video upload tool, a web application connected to a dedicated server for data collection. It took just under a week from the time it was requested to the time it was ready to go public.

Then the communications team in New Brunswick used social media and a news release to get the message out that the tool was available.

While this tool was used by the public, it's one that should only be requested for special investigations, says Janes. "Once you commit to doing something like that, you've got to be ready for the amount of information you're going to get."

Everything that's seized by the RCMP has to be viewed, organized, searchable and indexed. In the case of the Moncton shootings, they received more than 26,500 videos and images collected through all channels. It's taken a special multimedia team more than four months to go through all the data collected.

—Deidre Seiden

has always been to use it to help prevent and solve crime," says Greene. "That was always the goal. In fact, that's our entire communications objective."

Lauri Stevens, a social media expert specializing in law enforcement, says that the communications team understood what they needed to do.

"The beauty of it was it was very simple," says Stevens. "It wasn't a complex, rocket science kind of thing. It was very simple and extremely effective."

This isn't always easy in policing, she says. Quite often the police are focused on the operation and not on the communication around it. As people take to social media more and more, the outcome of police operations are affected by that, either positively or negatively.

"I see the necessity for communications and investigators to come closer and closer together and actually be working hand in hand," says Stevens. "And that's what happened during those 10 days. The communications team were in the know about what the guys on the ground were doing and they, in turn, collaborated and worked together to improve

the safety of the people on the ground."

Before this incident, the New Brunswick RCMP Twitter and Facebook accounts had 8,000 and 10,000 followers, respectively.

"We had a nice steady buildup of followers over the years," says Greene. "It was always on the rise, always going up and we knew that if we ever had to use this for anything we had to be able to engage that audience quickly and immediately. June 4 was absolutely that situation."

The day after the shootings, the number of people following Twitter jumped to 56,000 and Facebook went up to 28,000.

Steve Ladurantaye, the head of Government Partnerships, Twitter, Canada, was watching the account. He says that people were monitoring the RCMP NB account closely because it was their primary source of information.

"That's where they were going to get unfiltered, real-time information from the police force that they trust to provide that information," says Ladurantaye. "There was a significant number of retweets, which indicated that people were spreading the word to make sure that people in their own networks were aware of what was happening

around them."

It turned into a more proactive outreach, which Ladurantaye says was really interesting because people were trying to help the police as much as they could and taking instruction from them.

SAFETY PARAMOUNT

With three friends killed, two injured and a gunman on the loose, it would have been easy to let emotions take over, but this didn't happen.

"You try and just put this to the side, recognizing that our job is to keep the public safe and make sure no one else was injured," says Greene. "And even though we're communications, we just knew we had to assist with that. I think we did that really effectively."

The communications team was recognized by their international peers in law enforcement and communications with the ConnectedCops Social Media Event Management award. They ended up doing what they had to do because of a tragic situation, something that Vass says they always kept in the forefront of their minds.

"What we were able to do through social media in terms of keeping the public informed and aware of what was going on, and having that recognized by peers, basically confirms that we did the right things at the right time and for the right reasons," says Vass. ■





THRIVING UNDER HARDSHIP

CAMP ASSESSES SUITABILITY FOR ERT COURSE

By Deidre Seiden

Being a member of the ERT program has always been an aspiration of Cst. Dennis Silliker's. With just weeks to go before he's able to prove himself at the RCMP National Division Emergency Response Team's (ND ERT) selection camp, he's doing what he can to prepare himself, which is a challenge because he knows very little about it.

"I anticipate a lot of working until failure and bringing us to a point where they get to see our true character and whether or not our default setting is to work with the team or just do your own thing," says Silliker.

In fact, the only thing that the 16 candidates taking part in the selection process know is they'll be expected to work very long hours and perform and live in harsh conditions.

While it might seem odd that the candidates are kept in the dark about the camp, it's actually by design, says Insp. Rob Currie, ND ERT's officer in charge.

"There's a natural stress involved with not knowing what you're going to be doing," says Currie. "It continues at camp. The candidates don't know what's coming next. They don't know when they're going to sleep. They

don't know how long the tasks will be."

MISSIO PRIMUS

The rigorous selection process makes sense.

The team responds to and resolves incidents that are beyond the response capabilities of regular police because of an increased risk of violence.

They have to be prepared to be woken up in the middle of the night and leave at a moment's notice, work on little sleep for multiple days in a row, walk for hours on end or be confined to closed quarters for days or weeks, often in dangerous situations. And they must be ready to execute the mission, in any environment.

And unique to ND ERT is its members work internationally — a recent addition to their mandate — supporting protective policing operations as well as extra-territorial operations.

"Our motto is '*missio primus*' which means the mission first," says Currie. "We need people who need very little feedback. They know it's their job to make sure that the mission succeeds first. And if somebody's asked them to do something, they'll execute

the mission every time."

MENTAL CHALLENGE

That sounds simple, but when a person's personal gas tank is low, it's a different story.

The selection camp is the first step in finding those who can perform in those conditions.

The basic ERT assaulter course, an intense eight-week course, is held once a year, so Currie needs to make sure that he sends the right person.

He's confident in the camp and feels that if someone makes it through the process, they'll do extremely well on the ERT course — someone like Cst. Clark Aitken. He was the top pick after the last selection camp and was a strong candidate on the basic ERT course.

Aitken says he loved every minute of it and is now waiting to be transferred to the team.

"It's a long and arduous eight weeks," says Aitken. "Having benefited from the selection camp, I was definitely better mentally prepared for it."

The selection camp process is built around testing a person's fitness, their ability to adapt under stress, follow directions and retain information. They also test for phobias and a candidate's personal will.

Every task and drill candidates do are things that are achievable, says Cst. Andre Gallant, the ND ERT member who co-ordinated the camp. He knows this because it's all based on actual operations.

"Ultimately the candidates get to learn a lot about themselves," says Gallant. "But what we see, and we see it very clearly, is if the person is able to adapt under those conditions or if they don't."

While Silliker may not know what to expect at camp, he's working on the things he can control, like being physically fit. He can't know how he'll perform at camp, but his determination is clear — the word "quit" isn't part of his vocabulary.

"Am I ready for it?" says Silliker. "Yeah, I am, because I've already decided in my mind there's no way I'm giving up." ■

Skills like adaptability to unknown environments and superior map and radio skills are required to successfully complete missions like this one at a refugee camp. These skills, among others, are sought out at the National Division ERT selection camp.



National Division Emergency Response Team, RCMP



THE PARAMEDIC ADVANTAGE

BRINGING MEDICAL SUPPORT INSIDE A TACTICAL ENVIRONMENT

By Deidre Seiden

As one of 24 advanced care paramedics with Ontario Provincial Police's (OPP) Tactical Emergency Medical Service (TEMS), Shawn Pranger knows exactly what it means to have someone's back.

It's his job to go into a hot zone and treat injuries at the scene of high-risk and emergency situations, like an active shooter, alongside the OPP's tactical troops.

"If we're responding to an active shooter in an apartment building, we're right behind the stack with the guys going through the door," says Pranger. "If anyone gets hurt or injured, we're right there ready to respond immediately."

TACTICAL PARAMEDICS

The TEMS team are true experts in pre-hospital care. Each member is a full-time paramedic with an Ontario Emergency Medical Service (EMS), practising their skills five days a week. They work for the OPP on their days off.

Dr. Andrew Reed, who leads the TEMS program, says it's necessary for the OPP to have its own paramedics.

"It's potentially too dangerous for the local EMS to go into the perimeter of an emergency situation with us," says Reed. "Having TEMS means we can provide medical care where it can't be provided by regular EMS."

TEMS members have advanced tactical training to support any of the OPP's tactical teams like the Tactics and Rescue Unit (TRU), Emergency Response Team (ERT), Urban Search and Rescue, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives Response Team (UCERT) and the Public Order Units, when they attend high-risk calls.

But the safety of the TEMS member is paramount. "Any time they deploy into a hostile environment and they're still searching for a suspect, and the TEMS has to go and render assistance to somebody, they would be protected by tactical officers," says Reed.

TRAINED MEMBERS

The RCMP has taken a slightly different approach with its Emergency Medical Response Team (EMRT). Where the OPP



Ontario Provincial Police's Tactical Emergency Medical Service demonstrates how medical care is provided inside the perimeter of a high-risk incident.

takes paramedics and gives them police training, the RCMP takes its police officers with medical experience and gives them further training in tactical and emergency medical response.

Just like the advanced care paramedics in the OPP, EMRT members are trained to treat life-threatening injuries like gunshot wounds. They're armed with tourniquets and hemostatic dressings to stop a major hemorrhage.

They're also trained to assist with medical emergencies like breathing emergencies, hyper/hypothermia, burns and anaphylactic shock, among other things, to get injured police officers to the next step of extended care.

Sgt. Wendy Smith, the national coordinator of EMRT, says there's a big benefit to having police with medical training.

"Our members regularly work in dangerous environments," says Smith. "They're used to thinking about their own safety and security and have the training and tools to protect themselves."

Both TEMS and the EMRT are called out for active shooters, hostage situations, high-risk warrants, search and rescue situations and protests. "Basically the teams are called out to support potential or known high-risk situations," says Smith.

INTEGRAL SUPPORT

And for those police officers in the RCMP and OPP tactical troops, knowing there's medical support available reduces some of the stress of the situation.

"The peace of mind of having medical support, to know that there is a medic close by, it's just that extra comfort," says Reed. "Members are willing to put themselves at that level of risk — going through a door when they know there's a gun on the other side — because they know there is somebody there to help them if something goes wrong."

Sgt. John Welcher, a member of the New Brunswick ERT, says the EMRT is part of the whole package. "They're just as important as the ERT members doing the job. We've used them before, and when you use them on a call, then you realize how important they are."

No matter the approach taken, Smith and Reed agree that having medical support in the hot zone is vital.

"There's a huge difference with having EMS three or four blocks away, and having EMRT on scene, it permits members to remain focused and on the task while EMRT treats the injured," says Smith. "And depending on the type of injury that's sustained, if it's a major hemorrhage, two to four minutes can mean someone's life or death."

COVER

RESPONDING TO THE UNEXPECTED



HOW CAN POLICE FORCES BEST RECOVER AFTER A CRISIS OR DISASTER?

THE PANELLISTS

- Barbara J. Schmalz, Ph.D., R. Psych., RCMP divisional psychologist, Calgary, Alta.
- Dr. Juha Järvelin, program manager, Finnish Police Post Critical Incident Seminar Program, Finland
- S/Sgt. Roberta McKale, District Advisory N.C.O., Eastern Alberta District, RCMP



Tapping into victim support services is critical for members who are personally affected by natural disasters like the Slave Lake wildfires in 2011.

Police agencies plan and train extensively to be ready to respond to a serious incident, be it an active shooter, a terrorist attack or even a natural disaster. But how well do they deal with these physically and emotionally draining events once the worst is over? We asked our panellists for their take on how an agency, a detachment or an individual can best recover in the aftermath of a crisis.

DR. BARBARA J. SCHMALZ

A number of different police incidents will evoke reactions in police officers, individually and collectively. While emotional reactions are not uncommon, significant crises can have an intense and unexpected effect.

Despite a high level of functioning and mental toughness, police officers are still very much human, with their individual personal circumstances, history and capacity for empathy under the armour.

The first stage of recovery from large-

scale or serious police crisis events begins with education and awareness: identify what's going on with yourself, listen when you're told what to expect, and accept that it's normal — even for trained and resilient police officers.

Begin with the body's foundation by taking care of basic physical needs — food, drink, exercise and sleep, when possible. Don't expect to be functioning at full capacity. Expectations need to be scaled back.

There's a physical exhaustion that will eventually come from both the intensity of a crisis and from an intense emotional reaction. Once the adrenalin dump happens, then the emotional waves will follow, be it fear, anger or grief. It's important that individual officers have fewer expectations and demands placed on them — by themselves and the workplace.

Connecting with a support system, be it colleagues, close family members or peer

support, can be a life line for many after a crisis. Family members will need to receive the same information and education provided to the police officer about what to expect in the days, weeks, months and even years following the crisis.

Spending time in areas of your life that haven't been directly exposed to the event is strengthening, but loved ones will need to understand what may be happening with you. Ongoing assistance to family is often important to reduce the impact of secondary/vicarious reactions from the crisis.

Organizational support following a crisis is important for officers' future occupational health, morale, job performance and satisfaction. Beginning with arranging critical incident debriefings and other resources when appropriate, a supportive work environment can often be the one positive recollection that police officers talk about long after the crisis. It can be pivotal in re-



gaining resilience and the motivation needed to get back on the career path.

The long-term impact of a crisis will be evident on a number of levels, for an extended period of time. There will be ripple effects on family (on-duty injury or death), communities (flood, fire) and then the police officer will go back into the line of fire. While there's often time to recover and regain energy in the short term, the job will continue, bringing with it the possibility of another significant incident or crisis on that next shift.

The most effective recovery will occur in those who enter the crisis event in strong emotional and physical shape, when their lives are balanced and satisfying. If parts aren't healthy going into the event, the impact will be worse, and recovery prolonged.

Crisis events will often bring with them a clear message: nurture all aspects of your life, including relationships, keep things balanced and you will be less impacted over time and much better prepared for the next big event.

DR. JUHA JÄRVELIN

The Finnish Police has learned a lot after the Kauhajokki School shooting on Sept. 23, 2008, in which 11 people died.

What have we learned?

Our experience after the shooting taught us that there has to be defusing or debriefing following such an incident. We know that for most of the officers, the defusing and debriefings offered were enough to help them to cope after the event. However, there will be officers who need more psycho-social support.

After these kinds of critical incidents, we need to make sure that no one's left alone. If there's an officer who has no one with him or her at home, we shouldn't let this person go home by themselves. Our experience is that if they do, there's a very high risk of an officer suffering serious problems and being very stressed out. There's also a risk that the signs of potential post-traumatic stress disorder will be missed.

In the Finnish Police, it's mandatory for officers to attend arranged defusing and debriefing meetings. When it's mandatory, no one has to think about what their fellow officers will think or if attending will be seen as a sign of weakness.

After Kauhajokki, the peer support and one-on-one discussions with peers was the most effective way to support our officers. We have now started to create a Critical

Incident Stress Management model and a program for peer support.

In Finland, we use peers at defusings, at debriefings and in one-on-ones. If that isn't enough, we try to use police-friendly mental health professionals. These mental health professionals understand at least the basics of police work and a law enforcement officer's way thinking and acting.

We started the Post Critical Incident Seminar (PCIS) Program in the Finnish Police in 2012. Before then, we had nothing else to offer after the debriefing. The PCIS is based on the FBI and South Carolina Law Enforcement Assistance Program models. We have had very good results and every officer who was a member of the action team in Kauhajokki has taken part in PCISs.

In a nutshell, the Finnish Model ensures that first responders are taken care of in the aftermath of a crisis. Defusing the same day, debriefing within 24 to 72 hours, peer support (one on one) and after that, if needed, by trained psychologists who understand police work. The PCIS seminars should take place after six months.

Arranging the substantial aftermath actions is part of good leadership. The main goal is to take care of personnel and to secure their ability to work. With these occupational mental health and safety protection measures, money can also be saved.

There should be an external co-ordinator to facilitate the aftermath actions and ensure that all of those who were involved are taken care of. The follow-up procedure must ensure that everyone who's been in a critical situation in their work receives the help they need.

S/SGT. ROBERTA MCKALE

Here are a few tips I've gleaned from exposure to member support in the 2011 Slave Lake, Alta., wildfire disaster and the 2013 High River floods.

In Slave Lake, the local Victim Services Unit was evacuated from the community and sent to registration centres just like every other citizen. There was a lack of communication on how to make this service accessible to assist the members, families and the community. Victim Services wasn't deployed from the onset of the disaster, and this was a lesson learned. Victim Services has volunteers who can offer local information and support networks, and who have an existing relationship with the detachment.

When the flooding disaster in High River, Alta., occurred, the first thing the Member Wellness Team did was bring in Victim Services to support our members and their families, and plan for the long-term response for the community. The Member Wellness Team moved fast to get supports in place and liaised VSU with the Red Cross team. This allowed for a strong co-ordinated exchange of information and tapped into existing supports.

Members and their families are looked to as examples in a community. They have the added pressure of working through a disaster, then facing the consequences of how the community reacts in the recovery phase.

Removing members from active roles can be stressful for a detachment, but it's paramount that members take the time they need to piece their lives back together. It's a balance that really needs to include psychological support from health services, along with leadership to monitor the team.

Members want to be working in their community to help. However, citizens who react negatively under stress can compound emotions for members. I witnessed that at our front counter in Slave Lake when a citizen yelled at a staff member that they couldn't possibly understand the pressure of losing a home even though the member being yelled at had lost their home. This member remained calm and professional, but the toll is debilitating over time.

If services are available for the police forces, it's best to tap into them. An example of this is a disaster involving the Red Cross in which police officers, like other citizens, can register for support. Registering allows people to tap into services, information and training that's crafted to support the recovery.

The Red Cross and Victim Services Unit in Slave Lake after the wildfire disaster provided specialized programs and support to the detachment families. Information key to the recovery was provided through these services, and members and their families had access to specific courses and benefits for months after the incident.

One thing I've learned is that members are not fast to ask for help. Finances are stressful to discuss, but having those open supportive conversations with members and having access to a number of internal programs can be the difference in making an effective recovery. ■



WHY WAS BOSTON STRONG?

LAW ENFORCEMENT LESSONS FROM THE MARATHON BOMBING

By Herman B. Leonard, Christine M. Cole, Arnold M. Howitt, Kennedy School of Government Harvard University, Boston, Mass.

At 2:49 p.m. on the Patriots Day holiday, April 15, 2013, in Boston, Mass., hundreds of runners were about to finish the Boston Marathon in roughly a four-hour time. Many thousands remained on the course behind them, expecting to finish over the next two hours or more.

Elite runners — who both started earlier and ran faster — were nearly three hours gone from the finish area. Winners had already been wreathed with laurels, and many public officials and VIP spectators had since drifted away from the finish line.

The marathon is a massive community celebration, with more than 20,000 runners and tens of thousands of spectators lining the 26-mile (42.2-kilometre) route from Hopkinton — a rural town beyond the suburbs of Boston — to the finish line near Boston's downtown. Although many spectators awaited the runners still on the course, the crowds had begun to thin, and the stands that line one side of the street just before the finish were sparsely populated.

Many of the most senior people in organizations associated with running or securing the event had moved on to other

locations and activities. Those actually in charge of supporting the event, however, were still on the scene or in command centers from which they were monitoring the still in-progress event.

During the next minute, 12 seconds and 183 yards apart, two low-power improvised explosive devices contained in pressure cookers packed with nails and BBs detonated just short of the finish line. Three people died almost instantly; more than 260 others, some of them grievously wounded (including many who lost limbs), would require hospital care.

The 100 hours following the detonation saw a diverse series of law enforcement challenges confronted by a wide array of agencies that would pool, co-ordinate and deploy both their disparate jurisdictional powers and their diverse capabilities. Although further improvements could have been made in certain aspects of the response, most observers agree that, overall, law enforcement performance was highly effective. Why, in the frequently repeated phrase, was "Boston Strong?" What lessons does the Boston experience hold for

other law enforcement organizations?

CO-ORDINATED RESPONSE

Complex crisis events like the Boston Marathon bombing draw upon capabilities that generally don't reside in a single agency and therefore demand effective co-ordination across many organizational boundaries.

The answer to the question of how law enforcement agencies in Boston mustered an effective response has two parts: First, how did the involved agencies organize and co-ordinate in the moment, as the event evolved? Second, what prior preparations in the days, weeks, months and years before the event enabled these agencies to engage in this co-ordination when it was required?

The bombing resulted in at least five separate law enforcement challenges and responses over the ensuing four days:

1. Managing the immediate aftermath of the bombing itself: assisting survivors, helping to secure the area of the bombing and clear it of those not rendering medical assistance.
2. Securing area hospitals to which survivors were taken and other key infrastructure and installations that might be subject to secondary attacks.
3. Securing the crime scene, collecting evidence and conducting the investigation.
4. Planning and executing support for a visit by the President and First Lady to Boston for a memorial service and visits to area hospitals to speak with and comfort survivors and families.
5. Pursuing and taking into custody the two suspects after they hijacked a car and were found through the vehicle's locator.

The boxed numbers indicate the approximate location of the series of events that began late Thursday, April, 18, 2013 and continued into Friday, April 19, culminating with Dzhokhar Tsarnaev's capture Friday evening.



- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. 7-11 store robbery in Central Square | 5. General area of shoot-out and search for Dzhokhar Tsarnaev |
| 2. MIT police officer shot and killed | |
| 3. Mercedes SUV carjacked by suspects | 6. Dzhokhar Tsarnaev captured |
| 4. SUV owner escapes from suspects | |

The first three of these responses flowed naturally and immediately from the bombing itself. They emerged from the capabilities (the structures, relationships and personnel) that various agencies had stood-up in prepa-



Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick, alongside members of the Boston Police and FBI, addresses the media shortly after the marathon bombings on April 15, 2013.

ration for the marathon — a “fixed event” with long lead time.

Operationally, the event was organized in an incident management structure (IMS), including the formation of a unified command and co-ordination in planning and deployment between different agencies with jurisdiction for different locations.

The “peacetime” operational structure that had been overseeing the security efforts of crowd control and traffic management quickly transitioned to a “wartime” footing. The same managerial structure, quickly augmented by additional leadership as senior officials arrived at the scene, was now overseeing rapidly surged efforts: the post-bombing cleanup of the site, the securing of other facilities, and the collection of evidence and launching of the investigation.

The transition to a wartime posture was rapid and — adjusting for the intrinsically chaotic nature of a sudden attack — fairly efficient. Senior on-site commanders of different law enforcement and emergency management organizations immediately felt the need to join forces, and rapidly began searching for one another, forming increasingly large groups of co-located leadership.

They searched for a location for a com-

mand center, and chose a nearby hotel. They called their superiors, disseminated information about their location, and requested subordinates and superiors to gather in the command center. They sought key resources, including meeting space, food, telephones, laptops and tables.

And they began organizing, carrying out and delegating work — from designing and fielding the first press conference (two hours and one minute after the first bomb went off) to ordering a massive deployment of National Guard troops to secure the 13-block crime scene they had just defined.

In addition to dealing with the most immediate issues, they began working on plans for the next day: security in the public transit system, traffic routing around the restricted-area crime scene, and a myriad of other suddenly implied operational decisions and actions.

The fourth event — the massive security effort required for a presidential visit on Thursday, April 18 — placed a considerable additional burden on already-stretched law enforcement resources. Planning had to be carried out on short notice. As one senior law enforcement official observed, “The city may have needed this event, but law

enforcement didn’t.”

Nonetheless — and, again, drawing on the existing incident management structure that had sprung from the underlying operational management structure of the marathon — resources were located, co-ordinated and successfully deployed.

Starting in the evening that same day, following the release of photos of the suspects identified by the ongoing investigation, a rapidly evolving series of events unfolded over roughly the next 24 hours in nearby Cambridge, Allston and Watertown. This fifth set of law enforcement challenges included the assassination of an MTT police officer, a car hijacking and chase, a gunfight between officers and the suspects, the death of one and escape of the other, a day-long, house-to-house search in a 20-block area, and, ultimately, the capture of the last suspect after a massive salvo of law enforcement bullets.¹

MICRO-COMMAND ISSUES

During most of the final 24 hours, officers operated in highly disciplined, organized fashion, with superior officers from their own departments in command of deployed units and effectively co-ordinating with other units both in command posts and in the field.



However, at several points — in particular, during the Thursday night gunfight with the suspects and on Friday afternoon when the final suspect was apprehended — law enforcement agencies faced severe challenges in effectively establishing “micro-command,” specifically, the ability to exercise appropriate control and co-ordination over a group of officers in the field.

These micro-command issues arose when individual officers from the numerous police departments involved arrived on the scene independently in the midst of an ongoing, dangerous operation, and then acted on their own rather than looking for command and co-ordinating in a structured way.

In both instances, imperfectly controlled gunfire endangered officers and nearby civilians alike. In addition, a number of smaller episodes in this period illustrate the problems of loose or non-existent command when officers were operating outside of the command structure of their own departments.

These events point to an important issue of doctrine and training: the need to establish and practise better protocols for officers operating under circumstances when their own superior officers are not present to co-ordinate with individuals or units from other police organizations.

These failures of micro-command, however, were the exception during a week of mostly effective crisis performance. What facilitated the rapid formation of effective co-ordination in the aftermath of the marathon bombing was literally years of practice, relationship building, and joint planning and operation of major events in the Boston area.

While co-ordination was present earlier, the formal joint planning of fixed events was greatly spurred by planning efforts for the 2004 Democratic National Convention held in Boston. As the first national political convention after 9/11, this event received special national attention, resulting in a highly inclusive joint planning effort involving federal, state and local agencies.

In the aftermath, many of the participants concluded that it should become a regular protocol in advance of any major fixed event. Subsequently, events ranging from the Fourth of July fireworks, to the Boston Marathon, to victory parades for national champion sports teams were all jointly planned across multiple agencies and then operated through a unified command process. The repeated use of these structures resulted in the development of

cross-agency understanding of one another's capabilities, interests, mandates and imperatives, and the development and maintenance of personal relationships that enabled interagency trust and willingness to co-operate.

This “infrastructure”— built with continuing effort long in advance — was the foundation on which stood the ability of agencies suddenly to work together effectively in the aftermath of the marathon bombing.

There are five key recommendations for law enforcement from the events of the Boston Marathon bombing:

1. **Use IMS to plan fixed events:** Organize fixed events using incident management as the operational paradigm. This will help the events to run more smoothly and efficiently on good days — and will provide a ready framework within which a strong response can quickly be mounted on a bad day.
2. **If an incident occurs, activate an IMS-based response:** When and if an untoward event takes place in the midst of a fixed event, engineer a quick transition to a wartime footing, activating the unified incident management structure to develop and oversee the response.
3. **There may be a “lead” agency, but the command structure needs to be very flat:** The key concept is “unified” command, not “unitary” command. There may be a “first among equals,” but the emphasis should be on the “equals.” Under US doctrine (and law), the FBI is the lead agency for any terrorist attack. But the FBI has too little operational capacity to carry out the vast array of actions that need to be taken. And bossing other agencies (even if it might have the authority to do so, which in many cases it would not) isn't the best way to get the most effective work out of the whole team. In the marathon response, the FBI and other agencies formed a relatively flat and very effective team.
4. **Use the joint planning for fixed events to build, over time, the infrastructure of relationships and understanding that will produce greater co-operation in a moment of crisis:** Using incident management as the structure for planning and operating fixed events will

build the relationships and cross-agency understanding and knowledge of each other's strengths (and shortcomings) that will enable more effective co-ordination.

5. **Develop better protocols for micro-command in complex events:** Address the issues of micro-command in advance by developing better protocols for how law enforcement officers from different agencies should co-ordinate their actions by establishing a cross-organizational command structure when they come together under crisis conditions. Build instruction in these protocols into every officer's basic training and refresh this training in exercises throughout their careers.

The response to the Boston Marathon bombing vividly demonstrates effective action to co-ordinate in crisis but that capability should not be regarded as either guaranteed or fortuitous.

“Boston Strong” resulted from years of hard work. Any community can develop the infrastructure and capacities to field such a response, but not every community has. Boston's response shows a good example of what to do in the moment — and of how to build that capacity in advance. *

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The authors gratefully acknowledge support for the research underlying this paper from the International Centre for Sport Security.

¹ These events are described in our full report, *Why Was Boston Strong?: Lessons From the Boston Marathon Bombing*, by Herman B. Leonard, Christine M. Cole, Arnold M. Howitt and Philip B. Heymann, and issued in April 2014 by the Program on Crisis Leadership at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. Those interested in its wider range of conclusions and lessons should consult the full version.



BRIDGING A COMMUNICATION GAP

SYSTEM TO BOLSTER COLLABORATION DURING DISASTERS

By Jan Håvard Skjetne, research manager, and Aslak Wegner Eide, researcher, the BRIDGE project, SINTEF, Norway

Police forces and first responders in Europe are constantly facing new challenges and threats, particularly in relation to extreme weather and terrorist attacks. Coping with these complex events requires more efficient collaboration across agencies, organizations and countries.

The European research project BRIDGE (Bridging resources and agencies in large-scale emergency management) contributes to this by developing technical and organizational solutions for improving emergency management in the EU Member States.

The solutions will provide technical support for multi-agency collaboration in large-scale emergency relief efforts, ensuring interoperability, harmonization and co-operation across all levels of emergency management.

MEETING THE CHALLENGE

Rescue efforts depend first and foremost on the ability of large numbers of individuals to make difficult decisions rapidly — decisions that need to be communicated efficiently to others. Every aspect of technology development must therefore be based on the needs of the users of the systems involved.

Emergency responders currently have access to large amounts of information and communication options via a wide range of sensors, smartphones and networks. It's paradoxical that we seem unable to make use of all this when we need to. It's a problem that reduces the efficiency of major rescue operations.

Large-scale multidisciplinary rescue services are put into effect in much the same way as they were 20 years ago. This contrasts with other areas such as medicine, where new methods of treatment are constantly being developed, with important consequences for public health.

Research and development projects concerning emergency services are urgently needed, and the EU has met this challenge through the FP7 program by financing the BRIDGE project.

Over four years, ending in 2015, €18 million will have been committed to improving responders' ability to save lives and property when catastrophes strike. The project, which

was launched in April 2011, is led by the Norwegian research organization SINTEF.

BRIDGE aims to develop technology for improving communication and co-ordination during emergency management, particularly focused on co-operation among different agencies and organizations, on both national and transnational levels.

In addition to technological research and development, the project has also examined how European laws, ethics and social aspects affect co-operation, management and use of technology during major disasters. In order to ensure that appropriate solutions emerge from the project, a large number of first responders have been involved in the development and validation.

SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS

The core component of the BRIDGE system is a middleware (software that provides services to applications beyond those available from the operating system) that supports the flexible assembly of emergency response systems into a system of systems for agile emergency response.

Such systems include legacy systems such as health care or vehicle registration records, different sensors, camera systems, unmanned vehicles and several other data sources. To producers of emergency response systems, the BRIDGE middleware offers a consolidated set of software services organized in three layers that help the orchestration and communication between systems, and the management of data produced by the system during an incident's life-cycle.

COMMAND, CONTROL AND INFORMATION

Another central component developed in BRIDGE is a command and control information system for use in emergency management, named Master. The Master system provides a map-based common operational picture, mechanisms for resource allocation, message communication, weather forecasts and access to predefined object plans.

The common operational picture gives a customizable map-based overview of the situation, showing real-time information



During a large-scale training exercise in Norway, the incident commander (right) and commanders from other agencies use a table-top version of the Master system to get an overview of the situation.

retrieved from a number of other BRIDGE solutions and services. This includes information about incidents, response elements, risks, patients, response personnel and vehicles, relevant social media, video streams, expert advice, models and hospital availability information.

Users of Master can view, filter and add information in the common operational picture. Newly added information is automatically synchronized with all other running instances, allowing all users to keep an up-to-date view of the situation.

The resource allocation mechanisms allow users to assign personnel and vehicles to specific tasks and locations using drag and drop in the map-based view. The allocated resources are notified about the new task via a mobile application running on their mobile phones.

The system is intended to be distributed across all command chain levels in the organizations that take part in the response effort (strategic, tactical and operational levels). To support users on different levels, the tool has been tailored to run on a number of different devices, including desktop PCs, collaborative multi-touch tables, tablets and phones. ■



Maurice Ramirez



During an exercise in 2013, representatives from city departments gather in the Emergency Operations Centre to co-ordinate their response to planned and unplanned incidents.

CRISIS MAP

SAN FRANCISCO'S TOOL FOR DISASTER MANAGEMENT

By Kathy Harris, operations planner, San Francisco Department of Emergency Management, California

At first glance, the SF72 Crisis Map on San Francisco's emergency preparedness website appears to be just another embedded Google map. However, its ability to simultaneously display multiple types and sources of information about hazards and resources will be key to providing live updates to the community in a major emergency.

Its expanded menu reveals a comprehensive collection of static predictive analyses, dynamic real-time feeds from national sources and the capability for San Francisco's Department of Emergency Management to update the map in real time.

SUPPORTING PREPAREDNESS

Predictive analyses include static layers that indicate which areas of the city may be more susceptible or vulnerable to certain hazards. For example, in liquefaction areas, the soil can lose its strength and stiffness during an earthquake, and liquefy. The Tsunami

Inundation Zone layer was identified by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) Science Applications for Risk Reduction (SAFRR) to help predict the extent to which a tsunami would likely come ashore.

While there may be few direct actions that a resident or business owner can take to protect against potential liquefaction, increased awareness of those living or working in a tsunami inundation zone can help inform life-saving evacuation plans. Residents in inundation zones can include in their family emergency plans a primary and alternate safety route to a meeting point at higher ground and further inland. Community members with limited mobility can pre-identify who will help them evacuate to safety.

REAL-TIME FEEDS

Live feeds pulled from a variety of national data sources are automatically updated and displayed on the SF72 Crisis Map every few

minutes. These feeds show incidents that are in progress, such as active fires within the U.S. and earthquakes that have occurred (globally) within the last hour.

The American Red Cross' Active Shelters Layer provides the locations and descriptions (including capacity and current number of residents) of all its currently active shelters in the country.

Other live feeds display more routine information such as Doppler Radar for rain forecasting, and traffic updates.

ON-THE-FLY MARKUPS

In addition to the pre-loaded layers maintained by other partner agencies, the SF72 Crisis Map gives the City of San Francisco's emergency managers the ability to create unique map layers. Using a separate web platform called Google Maps Engine, these layers can be prepared in advance for planned special events or developed in real-time dur-



ing response to an emergency incident.

PLANNED EVENTS

Every year, the City and County of San Francisco prepare for a number of large gatherings.

The Bay to Breakers 12-km foot race involves more than 30,000 participants — and an additional 100,000 spectators — across the city from the San Francisco Bay west to the Pacific Coast's Ocean Beach.

The San Francisco Pride Celebration and Parade also draws thousands of participants and spectators. While the Pride Parade route is only two kilometres long, it can take upwards of five hours for the more than 200 contingencies to complete the parade route.

In these large planned events, the SF72 Crisis Map platform has been used to proactively share information to support the safety of participants as well as those who want to avoid the event. Event footprints and routes are delineated on the map, and the locations and anticipated duration of street closures are also identified. The map also displays additional related participant services such as medical aid stations, washrooms and water stations.

UNPLANNED INCIDENTS

The SF72 Crisis Map's flexible interface also allows the platform to adapt as unexpected and more complex response situations occur.

When the SF Department of Emergency Management duty officer is paged, one of his or her first actions is to mark the location of the incident on the map while gathering more information about the severity and potential impacts of the situation.

For example, in the event of a chemical spill, are the possible hazardous materials contained at a warehouse in an industrial area or leaking near a popular hotel in the downtown shopping district? Following a water main break, is the water flooding a major street requiring bus lines in the area be rerouted? If an armed person has been reported, what is their proximity to nearby schools?

Google Street View imagery also provides clues about the types of buildings involved. What type of structure is at the address of the three-alarm fire? Is it a business, a gas station, multi-storey residential building or some combination?

A quick glimpse of this information helps emergency managers anticipate what sort of responses and resource co-ordination

may be necessary. Gas station fires will likely have longer response times and may rapidly escalate to more a dangerous situation. If more resources are sent to the scene from other districts in the city, there could be a potential shortage if other large fires occur at the same time. When residential structures are directly or indirectly involved in a fire, there will likely be displaced persons in need of shelter and other support services.

Once the emergency manager confirms the location, type of incident and precautionary measures, information that the public needs to know is added to the SF72 Crisis Map. Often a tweet referencing the map is sent out, asking the community to "Avoid the area of ... due to Police/Fire/Utility activity."

The map shows the location of the incident and provides a shaded area that reflects a police line, a street closure or the recommended distance to stay away from the affected area to remain safe and avoid interfering with responder vehicles coming and going from the incident.

ADVANTAGES AND RISKS

By maintaining an active presence on social media, the San Francisco Department of Emergency Management and its partner city agencies are able to quickly deliver credible information to the community. This can help with rumor control and reassure the community that a response is in progress.

The SF72 Crisis Map is also one of the most effective ways to reach San Francisco's diverse population. As there isn't a one-size-fits-all solution for emergency notification, this map is a key addition to the city's already multi-dimensional notification toolkit.

Those who are already inclined to rely on social media as their primary source of information may be more likely to seek out the map from a Twitter reference. The map also provides a new avenue to inform visitors and tourists who aren't likely to be subscribed to — or aware of — San Francisco's emergency text-based notification system.

There are some risks to sharing information during large-scale disasters.

Information that might seem useful and interesting for the public to know has the potential to be used maliciously. For instance, after a major earthquake, cities may be reluctant to publish the locations of damage assessments for fear of attracting looters to homes that have been "red tagged"

as unsafe to occupy.

Also, Crisis Map shares intentionally vague notifications to provide enough information for the public to act upon (avoid a certain area of the city) but without drawing more attention and attracting onlookers.

It's for this reason that limited information is shared to advise an alternative route home, but not a detailed explanation of the exact reason why.

By helping train the public to think of the SF72 Crisis Map and related resources as an information hub, they'll be more likely to refer to it for real-time information in a major disaster like an earthquake rather than inundating the 311 information line and/or 911 with non-emergency inquiries.

FUTURE APPLICATIONS

Emergency managers are eager to identify more scenarios and creative ways to adapt existing technologies to support its special needs for information dissemination and collection during a disaster. While information on the map currently comes from the Department of Emergency Management and its response partners in other city departments, future versions may be better able to receive and share information from the public, including both needs and available resources.

For instance, after a major earthquake, a displaced family of four could request the help of nearby neighbours whose houses are safe to occupy. Or, in a power outage, a small business owner could invite members of his community to charge their cellphones with his generator.

Successful emergency management engages the whole community before, during and after an incident. Whether communicating about day-to-day small incidents or "the big one," SF72 Crisis Map's accessibility and unique capability to display different types of information empowers the community to take measures to protect their safety.

Rather than using fear tactics to prompt emergency preparedness efforts, Crisis Map helps support connections that foster resilient community networks. ■

FOR MORE INFORMATION,
PLEASE VISIT:
WWW.SF72.ORG





National Archives at College Park, MD

In December 1918, Seattle police officers patrolled the streets to ensure public safety. Wearing masks was mandatory for police in Seattle during the Spanish Flu pandemic.

WHAT'S YOUR PLAN?

MANY ISSUES TO CONSIDER IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE

By Joseph Scanlon

A priest is getting ready to celebrate a regular Saturday evening mass. Some teenagers are playing hockey at a rink. Three well-dressed men are about to get on a bus.

During a pandemic, all these seemingly innocuous activities could be breaches of the law.

When the Spanish Flu struck Canada between 1918 and 1920, local boards of health ordered schools, theatres, churches and other public places, including skating rinks, closed. They expected police to enforce those closures. If similar decisions were made today — and that possibility is included in plans — the priest and the teens playing hockey would be breaking the law.

In 1918, some provinces — Alberta for one — made the wearing of masks compulsory. Those caught without them were taken to court and fined. Unless the well-dressed men were wearing masks, they, too, could be law breakers.

Outbreaks of highly contagious and serious diseases, such as severe strains of the

avian flu, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and Ebola virus disease that's now ravaging West Africa, can lead to extraordinary measures that police may be expected to enforce.

In preparing pandemic plans, police agencies should be well versed in who has the power to enact such laws, and be certain that the rationale for enforcing extraordinary measures — and the implications of breaking the rules — will be fully explained to the public. The last thing a police department needs in an emergency is public resistance to orders because they haven't been fully explained.

Bylaw enforcement won't be the only policing challenge during a pandemic.

PLANNING FOR RISK

When an officer enters a home in which someone has died, others in that home could pass the virus on to him or her — and potentially the officer's family. And unlike seasonal flu outbreaks, pandemics strike young and healthy adults. Many patrol of-

icers are in the age group most at risk.

This scenario isn't hypothetical. The Canadian Pandemic Influenza Plan states that in a pandemic — when death rates soar — EMS personnel, nurses and police will have to declare deaths. For police, that could mean entering private homes where a death has occurred. But the plan doesn't spell out the implications of that policy.

A report prepared in 2009 for the U.S. Justice Department concluded that many pandemic plans "may have been written without law enforcement input and some of the stated roles and responsibilities [assigned to police] may not be realistic." It's a finding that should concern all Canadian police. The U.S. report was written with the help of two Canadians police officers — Alain Bernard from Ottawa and Tom Imrie from Toronto.

When SARS arrived in Toronto in March 2003, it came without warning. Police officers who responded to the first case at a Toronto home were unaware of the danger. As soon as the danger was understood, the



Toronto Police Service (TPS) tracked down and quarantined all potentially exposed officers. Eventually, 307 officers were voluntarily quarantined.

The health threat to these officers wasn't the only police issue during SARS. Police officers were expected to provide security at affected hospitals. The TPS had to provide staff for multi-agency emergency response centres. The agency also had to inform its personnel of the potential risks that SARS presented, something it did with a video that was produced and shown to all members within 24 hours.

Unlike SARS, a pandemic is likely to come after some warning. But once it arrives, it will likely cover the entire country within days if not hours, and will create major challenges for police.

Estimates are that as many as 40 per cent of uniform personnel will become sick or be forced to stay at home to look after sick family members. Just imagine a 13-member detachment with four or five off because of the flu, or a department of 200 people missing as many as 80.

And all of this will happen during such a widespread emergency that there's no mutual aid. Even in 1918 and 1919, when the Spanish Flu spread from coast to coast in about 10 days, mutual aid was very, very rare. Today, every community and every police department or detachment will have to cope on its own using the remaining resources it has available.

There will be other questions to address.

Health authorities may decide to "placard" homes in which people are ill with the flu. What are police to do if they catch someone sneaking out of one of those homes to buy groceries?

What happens when an officer is asked to check on families in an isolated area and he or she discovers an entire family ill, too sick to look after each other?

What happens if there is a limited supply of Tamiflu or vaccine? Should police be on the priority list?

All these possibilities should be addressed before a pandemic strikes so that clear policies are in place. It's most important to plan locally as every community will have its own challenges and must work out its own solutions.

THEN AND NOW

It might seem helpful to look back to 1918 and 1919 — when 30,000 to 50,000 Cana-

dians died from the flu — to see how police operated then. The available data that exists suggests that for the most part Canadians were compliant when closures and other orders were issued.

Theatre owners in Ontario argued that theatres didn't present a health risk. A skating rink in Amherst, N.S., hired a lawyer to argue its case to stay open. Officials listened politely but both closure orders stuck and both were complied with without police intervention.

While this is reassuring, there's a problem in making conclusions based on lessons from the past.

When the Spanish Flu struck in autumn 1918, Canada was at war. People had become accustomed to emergency decisions. Thousands of Canadians were still dying in Europe so when a call was issued for volunteers to nurse the sick, thousands of women volunteered, and some became ill and died.

When a less severe outbreak occurred in 1920, the war was over and the spirit of volunteerism had passed. Health officials in cities like Calgary and Toronto reported difficulty in getting volunteers.

Today, the situation will again be different, and some of these differences will affect police departments.

School closures will force working parents to find ways of caring for their children. This won't be easy especially when those children are sick. Parents who are absent from the workplace to care for their children will create problems for many agencies, including the police.

During the Spanish Flu, most people infected stayed at home; they couldn't afford to do otherwise. Now, most Canadians have hospital insurance. The Canadian Pandemic Influenza Plan assumes that people will stay at home in another pandemic but this may be a wrong assumption to make.

The U.S. Justice Department planners estimate that today, people are more likely to go to hospital than they were in 1918. They envisage long lines of people at hospital emergencies, many ill and upset because they can't get treated.

It's conceivable of course that in a new pandemic, as in 1918 and 1919, the Canadian public will accept the need for exceptional measures and that no enforcement will be required. But it's important that police review local plans to make sure what's expected of them is realistic especially when they are

almost certainly to be short of personnel. It would also be wise to make certain that police plans don't have unrealistic expectations of what other agencies will be able to do.

Many departments have developed pandemic plans and the RCMP Operational Readiness and Response Co-ordination Centre, created in 2006, has concluded that in a pandemic — as the scenarios in this article suggest — police would have to enforce public health orders like quarantines and travel restrictions, limit access to areas deemed out of bounds, transport and protect medical equipment or medications, protect certain types of facilities and, in a worst-case scenario, control crowds.

But a pandemic will not be so much one national emergency as it will be thousands of local emergencies all at the same time.

Departments and detachments need to know their local plans to make sure the role health officials expect them to play makes sense and that they will have the resources to do what is asked. They need to know who will be making the rules and how those rule makers see the rules being enforced. They need to be ready to spell out to their members precisely how they will deal with issues so their response will be consistent. They definitely need to be in on all public health-related communications so public expectations will be in line with police policy.

Agencies also need their own internal plans, including policies on sick and bereavement leave and personal health care.

More than half a century of research shows that people behave rationally in emergencies especially if they are kept accurately informed. But much of this research is about how people behave in floods, earthquakes, tornadoes and chemical spills, not pandemics. A new pandemic will to some extent mean a journey into the unknown.

Is a pandemic likely? Health officials say it's a certainty — they happen on average every 25 years — and the U.S. Justice Department study concludes that the impact on society and on police will be enormous. ■

Joseph Scanlon is professor emeritus and director of the Emergency Communications Research Unit at Carleton University. He has been studying individual and organizational response to emergencies since 1970 and recently has been reviewing the Canadian response to the 1918-19 Spanish Flu. He is a regular contributor to Gazette magazine.



THE MINDFULNESS DIFFERENCE

TRAINING AHEAD CAN HELP POLICE RECOVER LATER

By Lieut. Richard Goerling, Patrol Division, Hillsboro Police Department, Oregon

First responders are in the business of trauma: human suffering, tragedy and dark choices of human behaviour that on occasion require members of the force to confront the worst of violence against humanity.

Stepping into the center of this trauma, as members do on a daily basis, has inherent risks. The tactical risks are understood and mitigated with precision and art of war. The human risks, however, are widely experienced and narrowly understood.

A look at contemporary and historical police literature on occupational stress sends a message that police trauma is a formidable opponent. News and entertainment media sensationalize, glorify and sometimes demonize the outcomes of violence confronted by police.

These force encounters are not the singular source of traumatic event for the first responder. Often, the trauma visits in more subtle exposure to human suffering. This continuum of trauma exposure is further exacerbated by time. Over the course of a career, human suffering, chronic occupational stress and traumatic events batter members.

The consequences are little understood, both seen and unseen, as they manifest in the first responder and their family, the organization, and the community. To be clear, police occupational stressors are a clear and present danger to these groups. It is, however, the nature of the job of policing to confront risk. Seemingly, we step into these occupational risks with, at best, resignation and acceptance that trauma will have a negative impact.

Adept leaders in policing and related disciplines have blazed the trail for organizational response to trauma. From these innovative leadership efforts came the Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM) model and various post-critical incident protocols that many agencies have adopted over the last decade. In some cases, legislative bodies have mandated these protocols. In other cases, organizations create and model best practices.

The CISM model has evolved over the last several decades and provides important

post-trauma intervention for first responders and others affected by critical incidents. This is an instrumental part of public safety organizations and must continue to evolve into the 21st Century. Despite its importance, CISM remains a reactive intervention.

Police leaders and community members have an opportunity to lead collaboratively and shift toward *preventative* intervention. While no simple solution to occupational stress exists, changing the construct is possible. With this paradigm shift comes new possibilities of resilience, hope and enhanced health and wellbeing. This is achieved with a simple principle: train before the trauma.

FITNESS OF MIND, BODY AND SPIRIT

A resilience model that trains skills in resiliency can have a significant positive impact on officer wellness and on the outcome of the police-citizen encounter. The theme to this integrative resilience model is the focus on the connectivity of mind-body health.

The following dimensions are addressed: preventative mental health, cultivation of cognitive fitness (mindfulness), physical fitness, social wellness and spiritual fitness.

While many definitions exist, in this context, resilience can be defined as "the ability to cope well with high levels of ongoing disruptive change; to sustain good health and energy when under constant pressure; to bounce back easily from setbacks; to overcome adversities; to change to a new way of working and living when an old way is no longer possible; and to do all this without acting in dysfunctional or harmful ways" (Siebert, 2005).

At the foundation of this resilience model is mindfulness. Developing keen self-awareness through mindfulness-based training provides a platform for personal and professional development, healing and self-actualization that few other interventions bring to the police culture.

Jon Kabat Zinn defines mindfulness as "the awareness that emerges through paying attention on purpose, in the present moment, and non-judgmentally to the unfolding of experience moment by moment"

(Kabat Zinn, 1990).

In the late 1970s, Zinn developed the Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) model at the University of Massachusetts Medical School. Time and again, studies have demonstrated the success of MBSR at improving the health and wellbeing of those who have experienced this eight-week training model, even when students don't continue a regular mindfulness practice.

This secularized meditation practice provides an opportunity for sitting quietly with focused attention on the breath, without judgment of "right or wrong" in how nor in what thoughts come up during sitting. So simple, it can be the most difficult thing to attempt.

CREDIBLE BENEFITS

The encouraging reality for police leaders is the plethora of scientific evidence that supports the efficacy of mindfulness training, across disciplines. This includes some remarkable studies in training mindfulness to U.S. Marines by Elizabeth Stanley and Amishi Jha (2009). One need not look very far to find credible and relevant information that supports the value of mindfulness in policing.

Cultivating a practice of mindfulness offers untapped possibilities for police officers and resonates with the warrior tradition of "grounded compassion and skillful action" (Strozzi-Heckler, 2003). This self-awareness skills training develops into situational awareness training, which develops into cognitive performance training. These health and performance benefits translate into both the human and organizational calculus: healthier people in uniform and a return on investment for the organization.

In an effort to change course toward a preventative model, the Hillsboro Police Department (HPD) began a bold pilot project to bring mindfulness training to police officers in 2013.

The HPD, working with Pacific University and the Hillsboro Stress Reduction Clinic, developed the Mindfulness Based Resilience Training (MBRT). Modelled



after Kabat Zinn's MBSR, this training was an eight-week course where officers and professional staff (non-sworn) attended class at the yoga studio once weekly for two and a half hours.

Additionally, at week six, the course included an all-day silent retreat. A certified MBSR teacher from the Hillsboro Stress Reduction Clinic taught the MBRT courses. Three separate cohorts were offered from fall 2013 through spring of 2014 with 48 students actually finishing the course.

Research conducted by Pacific University demonstrated improvements in a number of dimensions: perceptions of administrative stress, operational stress, sleep, pain management, anger (emotion regulation), reactivity, burnout, resilience and acting with awareness. This is a groundbreaking study that paves the way for further research and training with mindfulness in policing.

It's notable that mindfulness training positively impacted the officer's sleep management. With sleep deprivation, a significant health and risk management issue in policing, this is a hopeful finding. Mindfulness training as a preventative intervention stands to develop necessary skills for members to thrive, not simply survive.


Several years of collaboration led to the creation of the Pacific Institute on Community and Organizational Wellness at Pacific University. This institute will deliver ongoing MBRT for regional first responders, conduct further research on responder and community resilience, and sponsor regular leadership summits for dialogue and innovation.

In addition to mindfulness training for the individual responder (MBRT), the institute will develop mindful leadership training for police leaders. Training leaders to find the headspace for the art of leadership is critical for healthy first responders and healthy organizations. Further, HPD will be developing mindfulness training in short, consumable blocks that are integrated into police tactics training.

Training the individual responder, training mindful leaders and cultivating a practice of mindfulness, in small ways, throughout the arch of the police officer's work lends powerful authenticity to a police organization. This is fertile ground for community building.

LEARN, COLLABORATE, EXPERIMENT

There are a few key ingredients and recom-



Officer Eric Russell, a former U.S. Marine, participates in Mindfulness Based Resilience Training during the Hillsboro Police Department's mindfulness pilot project in 2013. The training is a shift toward preventative intervention.

mendations to consider in moving forward. Take the time to read relevant research on mindfulness training in the military. Then perhaps subscribe to one of the many magazines that regularly write on mindfulness. Read a book about mindfulness skepticism turned support; there are many contemporary options at bookstores. Mindfulness will rapidly be seen as science rather than sentiment.

The success of the HPD training was due to collaborative leadership. Getting outside of the police paradigm and building multi-disciplinary partnerships is imperative. Collaboration makes evolution possible. Without this teamwork and infusion of ideas that bring some level of discomfort, little worthwhile happens.

Building relationships with academia, mental health professionals, physical fitness experts, yoga teachers and meditation teachers is important. Build these relationships and cross-pollinate cultural competencies. Teach the yoga teacher and the professor to be competent in police culture and to understand as best possible what members face in the field, and back at the office. Stretch yourself to sit on the mat and learn their world. This will pay dividends, and make you healthier.

Build an ad hoc, collaborative and

multi-disciplinary team and experiment with mindfulness training. Start small. Use a phone app; there are several very good ones. Use a podcast from a university or other meditation center. Do something. Measure it. Assess and try again. Stay awake to the possibilities.

Mindfulness nurtures the warrior soul. No contemporary police training steps so far outside the comfort zone of culture to bring such hope for healing deep inside the culture. Lead forward. ■

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Moncton Times & Transcript



Police leaders and front-line members have become better at supporting each other in the aftermath of traumatic exposure and understanding the roles that police can play in the community when high-profile traumas occur.

HIGH-PROFILE TRAUMA FROM PERSONAL IMPACT TO COMMUNITY SUPPORT

By J. Kevin Cameron, executive director, Canadian Centre for Threat Assessment & Trauma Response

There's a standard in the field of trauma response that when the human organism (man, woman, boy or girl) is truly impacted by trauma, they tend to either remember too much or too little of the original trauma they were exposed to.

The reason for this variance among human beings is, in part, due to our own unique physiology and the neurochemical reaction in the brain at the time of traumatic exposure. In other words, trauma is stored in the body at the cellular level and, without proper understanding and support, an individual can't always resolve the symptoms by assuming that "time will heal all wounds."

Profound traumatic exposure untreated will take on a life of its own inside the human organism to the point that many people — months and years after initial exposure — won't make any connection between their current functioning and the role that historical and untreated trauma has played in it.

Police and other emergency responders need to continue growing in their understanding of trauma from a modern scientific perspective. As police leaders and front-line members have become better at supporting each other in the aftermath of traumatic

exposure, the benefits are twofold: a heightened quality of professional and personal life for police officers impacted by trauma and a greater understanding of the roles that police can play in the community when high-profile traumas occur.

These roles go beyond the criminal investigation and initial emergency response. Policing agencies that deal in healthy ways with the realities of the impact of trauma on individual members will by nature work better at the community level with children, youth, families and schools impacted by high-profile violence and other traumatic events.

Following the June 4, 2014, shootings in Moncton, N.B., an alert was sent out to professionals across North America entitled *Violence Threat Risk Assessment (VTRA) protocols must be utilized to their fullest during this extended critical period.* This is because from April 2, 2014, when the second Fort Hood, Military Base shooting occurred to the week of the Moncton tragedy, there were more than 15 mass shootings or stabbings across Canada and the United States that were dominating the news.

In four of the shooting incidents, police were targeted. The reason for the alert was

simple: the fields of Violence Threat Risk Assessment (VTRA) and Crisis/Trauma Response are inseparably connected.

We now understand that high-profile media-focused violence doesn't cause other people to go from no risk to copycatting these tragedies. Instead, high-profile violent traumas intensify already existing symptoms in troubled individuals exposed to the intense media coverage.

We call it the Trauma Violence Continuum (TVC), where even non-violent traumas (e.g. SARS outbreak) can increase violence potential from fearful individuals or conspiracy theorists. And when they act out, serious violence occurs and results in a second trauma, becoming self-perpetuating. However, the TVC becomes even more intensified following blatant cases like the above-noted mass homicides.

In the aftermath of the December 14, 2012, Sandy Hook School Shooting, the author wrote a 15-point consultation report with a focus on ensuring that traumatic aftermath supports were not just for the children, families and school staff but for the many police and emergency responders who were exposed to the carnage of that day and



in the days that followed.

One of the greatest mistakes made over the years by our old-fashioned ways of thinking was that professionals of all stripes should be able to just "suck it up and move on." But years of painful learning has made it clear that no uniform is a protection against the very human response to trauma and in some cases, because of unrealistic expectations, the uniform has actually made asking and receiving support a barrier.

A question asked in both VTTRA and trauma trainings conducted by the author is "do all police detachments and services function the same?" The same question is asked of hospitals, schools, mental health clinics, fire departments, probation offices, etc. The answer is always "no." A second related question is asked: "Does each police service have its own personality?" The answer is always "yes." Why are these questions relevant?

In the aftermath of the April 1999 Columbine, Colorado, and Taber, Alta. school shootings, it was becoming clear that human-systems dynamics were also a factor in how we respond and recover (or not) from trauma.

From a police perspective that means police services with strong, open and emotionally intelligent leadership will manoeuvre through tragedies with greater success than those led by closed, distant and non-emotional leaders who fail to demonstrate (real or perceived) true caring for their members.

We say that closed systems generate high levels of anxiety internally because as natural symptoms develop and professionals get the message (spoken or unspoken) that they need to just suck it up and move on, they will cease communicating, try to deny their symptoms and deteriorate in a systems-generated pressure cooker. The result we have seen too many times across many professional disciplines goes from substance use as a way of self-medicating to depression, domestic violence, suicide and others.

In the past, we tended to look at these outcomes as individual pathology only (what is wrong with this person?) but we now understand that healthy and open organizations can manage the weight of trauma far better than closed and disconnected systems can. Therefore the modern work in the aftermath of high-profile trauma has been to not just focus on individual responses but on how the overall system responds as well.

The same dynamics that govern how police detachments and larger policing services operate

are similar for other human systems like schools, post-secondary institutions and other workplaces. What differs is the type of responsibility and obligations as well as a heightened potential for danger in policing that is not regularly anticipated in these other settings.

And in the case of schools, we include the added dynamic of caring for children and youth. As such, the Traumatic Events Systems (TES) Model was developed to guide schools, police, mental health and other helping professionals in both the initial response and long-term recovery from high-profile violent traumas, suicides, etc. The model has four phases:

Phase 1. Initial response: student system

Phase 2. Comprehensive strategic assessment: school adult system

Phase 3. Community intervention: parent/family system

Phase 4. Traumatic aftermath: Preparing schools and communities for the process of recovery

MODELLING CALM

As relates to schools, police play a huge role in the first principle of crises/trauma response: "model calmness." Because of the Trauma Violence Continuum (TVC), we've seen many cases during Phases 1 and 2 in which traumatized students, parents and even staff, from time to time, become so emotionally incapacitated that they engage in dangerous impulsivity, and they do and say things they normally wouldn't.

We've found that having uniformed police officers assist school staff and counselors in touching base with identified triaged students (and others) helps to communicate that we're now safe because the school and police are working together.

Especially in the aftermath of school shootings and other serious violence cases or threats of violence that become public (e.g. social networking threats), there are usually several Violence Threat Risk Assessment (VTTRA) cases that surface within minutes to hours of the original incident.

Police presence in the school staff meetings is essential to provide factual information and give their initial assessment of current risks and any measures being co-operatively taken with other community

partners (school, hospital, etc.), while again modelling calmness. If the adults in the school setting are calm, then it will trickle down to the students and parents as well.

Skilled police officers can bring calm to non-policing professionals by their words and demeanor alone. The same modelling of calmness by police is duplicated in Phase 3 where the focus moves to the evening parent/community meeting where again formal police presence is essential. As appropriate, much of the same information is shared with parents but with police also taking a lead in publicly encouraging help not just for students but for parents and caregivers who may need professional support.

When the emotionally closed or distant parent hears a police officer articulate the realities that anyone can be impacted by trauma, many become more willing to be open to help. Where possible, there should be both male and female police officers present who can even briefly encourage fathers and mothers to take an active role in response and recovery.

Phase 4 deals with the fact that some individuals can be traumatized but have a denied or delayed response to the trauma. One of the most predictable critical periods (predictable timeframe for increased threat-making or threat-related behaviour) is the "anniversary reaction."

We've seen suicide pacts and planned shootings all meant to occur on or about the date of the traumatic anniversaries. Even more subtle is the individual deterioration of adults and children alike who've suppressed symptoms or denied their existence until they get close to the anniversary often with no insight into what's happening to them.

Because trauma is stored in the body at the cellular level sometimes even neutral stimuli like a benign smell that was present at the time of traumatic exposure can trigger a delayed response months, a year or more later.

This reality requires police to consider the trauma history of every community in which they serve. That history can then be used as both intelligence gathering for who may be making threats at a particular time and for community support for predictable times at which some may understandably struggle. »

J. Kevin Cameron is a board-certified expert in traumatic stress. He is executive director of the Canadian Centre for Threat Assessment & Trauma Response and a Diplomate of the American Academy of Experts in Traumatic Stress.

just THE FACTS

SCHOOL VIOLENCE

School violence has become the focus of intense attention in recent years. It can be subtle and go almost unnoticed, such as some bullying and verbal threats; in other cases, it can escalate to large-scale violent acts such as those witnessed at Sandy Hook Elementary School or École Polytechnique. While such serious attacks are rare, violence of any kind has the power to change the way we think about school safety.

According to PREVNet, a Canadian network of researchers and organizations who work to stop bullying, the majority of bullying occurs in the classroom, on the school playground and on the school bus where children are most often together.

Their research also suggests that in a classroom of 35 students, between four and six children are bullying and/or are being bullied.

Without intervention, a significant number of youth who bully in childhood will continue to bully as they move through adolescence and into adulthood. From early adolescence, new forms of aggression emerge. Bullying diversifies into more sophisticated forms of verbal, social, homophobic, sexual and racial-based aggression.

The 2006 Health Behaviour in School-aged Children study in Canada reported that children who are involved in bullying often report negative feelings about their school.

In a 2002 study by the U.S. Secret Service and U.S. Department of Education that analyzed 37 incidents of targeted school violence, researchers found that almost three-quarters of the 41 attackers felt persecuted, bullied, threatened, attacked or injured by others prior to the incident.

In a 2006 U.K. Home Office study of young people and crime, about seven per cent of 16 and 17-year-olds reported carrying a knife (most commonly a penknife) at

some time in the previous year with less than one per cent carrying a gun.

Students aren't the only ones in danger of school violence. In 2014, the U.S. Centres for Disease Control and Prevention found that almost seven per cent of teachers reported being threatened or physically injured by a student from their school.

Of the 10 deadliest mass shootings in U.S. history as compiled by CNN in 2014, four took place in schools or universities. Of those, most of the shooters were young men attending those institutions.

Canada's deadliest school shooting took place at Montreal's École Polytechnique engineering school. The 25-year-old shooter walked into a classroom, separated the men from the women, and then killed 13 female students and injured another 13. He then committed suicide.

Many acts of school violence take place weeks apart. A 2001 study in the *Archives of Pediatrics and Adolescent Medicine* revealed that 50 days after the Columbine High School shooting in 1999, Pennsylvania school districts reported 354 threats, skyrocketing from the one or two threats reported in the same period a year earlier.

Research by Dr. Peter Langman in the journal *Forensic Digest* identified several warning signs that a student may be at risk for committing violence: direct threats that clearly announce their intentions, condoning or favourably commenting about a school shooting, and foreshadowing their attacks in the content of school assignments.

According to Dr. Langman, clusters of warning signs — such as desperate depression, explosive anger and an obsession with weapons and violence — increase the likelihood of an attack. Taken together, they are a volatile mix.

In Canada, the School Action for Emergen-

cies (SAFE) plan is an electronic database that was released in 2007. It houses site-specific emergency response plans that help police and front-line workers respond efficiently to serious school incidents.

To date, approximately 5,000 schools in RCMP jurisdictions across Canada are participating in the program.

The SAFE Plan can be applied in any school event or situation that requires police deployment, including an active shooter, bomb threat or hostage situation. The plans are developed in close collaboration with all emergency responders and the schools.

— Compiled by Katherine Aldred





LIGHT IT UP

ARSON ANALYSIS TOOL HELPS SOLVE CASES FASTER

Arson is one of the hardest crimes to solve because the evidence is actively being destroyed as the crime is committed. Dr. Mark Sandercock, a scientist in Trace Evidence at the RCMP's National Forensic Laboratory Services in Edmonton, Alta., and Professor James Harynuk of the University of Alberta (U of A) developed a computer program that can analyze arson debris in seconds. Deidre Seiden spoke to Sandercock about the benefits of the tool.

HOW DO YOU CURRENTLY ANALYZE ARSON DEBRIS?

When a fire investigator thinks a fire is suspicious, he will collect samples taken from the possible area where the fire originated. The samples are usually very burnt, often unrecognizable bits of material from the scene such as flooring or furniture. At Trace Evidence, we extract the volatiles from the arson debris and analyze them for an ignitable liquid, such as gasoline. But in doing so, we're also extracting all of the other volatile compounds produced by the burning of the materials at the fire scene. We're looking for something in a very complex background, much like looking for a needle in a haystack.

Two scientists are assigned to examine the data we obtain from the arson debris analysis in a process we call peer review. One scientist reviews the data and writes up her findings. Then that result will go to a second scientist who reviews all of the first person's work. If their findings are in agreement, a report will be written and it will go back to the investigator.

DOES IT TAKE A LONG TIME?

It can take about an hour to process the data from a straightforward sample. But some samples are quite complex, and can take several hours, or even a full day just to interpret the data from one sample. If you have two people examining the data for each sample, our scientists can spend a significant amount of time reviewing data.

IS THIS WHY YOU COLLABORATED WITH THE U OF A?

Yes, we worked with the U of A to develop a computer program that can examine the data from arson debris in seconds and correctly



Dr. Mark Sandercock has always been interested in the problem of how to solve arson cases faster. His answer: help develop a tool that can analyze arson debris in seconds.

identify if gasoline is present. If we can implement this model in our laboratory, it could eliminate the need for the second scientist to review the data because the computer can look through the data set from one sample in about 10 seconds, saving us a lot of time.

HOW DID YOU GET INVOLVED?

As the program technical leader, I'm always looking at what's out there and what we can use to help us do our jobs better. So when a new professor in the chemistry department at the U of A called me looking for research ideas, we started discussing various possibilities. This particular one caught James' interest so he ran with it. The university did the work and I had the great job of being their consultant and helping them stay on track.

HOW WOULD THIS IMPACT AN INVESTIGATOR?

It'll have a two-fold impact for our investigators. The obvious one is the arson cases will leave our building sooner and the results will

go back to the investigator that much faster. The second benefit is, because we're spending less time doing these reviews, the scientists are freed up to do other casework.

HAS IT BEEN USED YET?

Not yet. But we did a pilot study where we took several hundred samples that we had processed and gave the data to the U of A. They ran the data through their computer program and they got the same results that we did. If there wasn't gasoline in the sample, the computer program didn't find it, and where there was, the computer program did find it. That was basically proof of concept that it worked.

Two things need to happen before the program is ready to be used in our lab. First, the U of A is building a user-friendly interface so it's easier for us to run the program. They also want to build their database so it covers a broader range of ignitable liquids. Optimistically, we are about two or three years away from trying it out in our laboratory.



Boston Police Department



Boston police officers work at an assigned hot spot location as part of the Safe Street Team (SST) initiative. The SST program was associated with a 17 per cent reduction in violent crimes, according to a criminologist embedded in the BPD.

WEALTH OF KNOWLEDGE

THE VALUE OF EMBEDDING CRIMINOLOGISTS IN POLICE DEPARTMENTS

By Professor Anthony A. Braga, Ph.D., School of Criminal Justice, Rutgers University

Partnerships between police and academics have recently become much more collaborative and focused on working together in addressing crime. In contrast to more traditional academic-police research partnerships, embedding a criminologist within a police department involves taking the step from external partner to internal resource.

Embedded criminologists maintain their scientific objectivity and independence in carrying out scientific inquiries within police departments. However, an embedded criminologist also functions as an important part of the police organization by collaborating on the development of programs through crime-problem analysis and evaluation research and by interjecting scientific evidence into policy conversations to guide police executive decision making.

In this article, I briefly summarize my

work as an embedded criminologist in the Boston Police Department (BPD) during the tenure of former Commissioner Edward F. Davis between 2007 and 2013.

THE BOSTON EXPERIENCE

In December 2006, Davis was sworn in by Mayor Thomas M. Menino as the BPD Commissioner. After experiencing dramatic decreases in violent crime over the course of the 1990s, Boston experienced a resurgence of serious violence during the early to mid-2000s, peaking at 7,533 violent index crimes in 2006.

Most concerning was an increase in assaultive street violence, especially assaults committed with guns. The yearly number of fatal and non-fatal shootings increased 133 per cent from 162 in 2000 to 377 in 2006.

During the first months of his tenure

as commissioner, Davis appointed me as his chief policy advisor and assigned me to work with the BPD on a set of strategies that would better position the department to manage the small number of places and small number of people generating the bulk of the violence in Boston.

CONTROLLING VIOLENT CRIME HOT SPOTS

Commissioner Davis implemented the Safe Street Teams (SST) hot spots policing strategy in January 2007. Using computerized mapping technology and violent index crime data for the 2006 calendar year, I worked with the BPD Boston Regional Intelligence Center (BRIC) to identify 13 violent crime hot spot areas to receive the SST program.

A deputy superintendent was assigned to oversee the SST initiative and, in each



violent crime hot spot, a team of one sergeant and six patrol officers were permanently assigned to implement community problem-solving actions.

As the program was implemented, the BPD wanted to make certain that the SST areas were indeed centered on some of the most persistently violent places in Boston. Long-term investments of scarce police resources in violent crime hot spots would make little sense if the location of these hot spots shifted year to year irrespective of police activities.

As such, we analyzed the concentration and stability of violent crime in specific hot spot locations over time in Boston. The purpose of this exercise was to ensure that the SSTs were appropriately assigned to those locations that consistently generated repeated violent crime incidents over a longer time period.

The analysis uncovered remarkable stability in violent crime trends at specific street block faces and intersections. With regard to robbery, from 1980 to 2008, about one per cent of street block faces and eight per cent of intersections were responsible for nearly 50 per cent of all commercial robberies and 66 per cent of all street robberies.

The story was much the same for gun violence, as only five per cent of street block faces and intersections experienced 74 per cent of the gun violence in this same time period. Nearly 89 per cent of the street block faces and intersections in the city did not experience a single shooting event during this 29-year time period. Amazingly, the worst 60 street block faces and intersections in Boston experienced more than 1,000 shootings between 1980 and 2008.

While the analysis confirmed that SST officers were allocated to persistently violent locations, this exercise also revealed that there were many violent places in Boston that weren't covered by the SST program. As such, statistical matching techniques were used to identify similarly violent comparison street intersections and block faces for inclusion in a rigorous quasi-experimental research design.

The evaluation revealed that the SST program was associated with a statistically significant 17 per cent reduction in violent crimes in the program areas relative to the comparison areas. A subsequent analysis of locations surrounding the program and comparison areas revealed no evidence of

significant violent crime displacement. In other words, violent crime didn't simply move around the corner due to focused police attention in the hot spot areas.

REDUCING GANG VIOLENCE

Despite international acclaim, the BPD discontinued the well-known Operation Ceasefire-focused deterrence strategy as its primary response to outbreaks of gang violence in January 2000. Given the concerning resurgence of gang-related shootings in Boston, Davis announced soon after his appointment that Operation Ceasefire would once again be the BPD's main response to outbreaks of serious gang violence. As was the case in the 1990s, I once again became a member of the Ceasefire working group and my first contribution was to complete a fresh problem analysis of homicides and gang-involved shootings in Boston.

The problem analysis research revealed that the resurgence in gun violence during the 2000s was linked to the same underlying gang dynamics as the 1990s. In 2006, slightly more than one per cent of the city youth between the ages of 14 and 24 participated in 65 street gangs that were active in violence.

However, street gang violence generated more than half of total homicides and gang members were involved in nearly three-quarters of non-fatal shootings as victims. The gun violence offenders and victims were often very well known to the criminal justice system with long criminal histories and many being under probation and/or parole supervision.

Focused deterrence strategies honour core deterrence ideas, such as increased risks faced by offenders, while finding new and creative ways of deploying traditional and non-traditional law enforcement tools to do so, such as communicating incentives and disincentives directly to targeted offenders. Research products that document these high-risk social networks and the violent behaviours of particular groups over time are very valuable in ensuring that these strategies are sustained in particular jurisdictions.

Working with the BRIC, we developed gang shooting scorecards to help guide Ceasefire implementation. In its most basic form, shooting scorecards are simply rank-ordered frequencies of the criminal groups that commit the highest number of shootings and experience the greatest number of shooting victimizations during a specific time period.

Shooting scorecards, especially when supported by a management accountability system (in this case, the Ceasefire working group meetings and broader Compstat sessions), can be very helpful in ensuring that the groups most active in gun violence, and the groups that offend after the deterrence message has been delivered, receive the enforcement attention they merit.

Scorecards keep the operational partners focused on risky groups over time and maintain the implementation of the focused deterrence strategy as a whole. Gang shooting scorecard data was then used to conduct a rigorous quasi-experimental evaluation that revealed the re-invigorated Ceasefire focused deterrence strategy generated a 31 per cent reduction in shootings involving targeted gangs relative to shootings involving similarly violent non-targeted gangs.

CONCLUSION

The Boston experience suggests that police departments do benefit in tangible ways by adding criminologists to their staffs. The idea of embedding a criminologist inside of a police department to work alongside practitioners on particular program initiatives and as a general resource for a wide range of issues represents an evolution from traditional academic-police research partnerships that are usually limited to very specific projects and typically last for very short time periods.

Working in close partnership with sworn and civilian staff, embedded criminologists can enhance the capacity of police departments to understand the nature of ongoing crime problems and develop innovative programs to prevent these problems from recurring.

It's important to note here that embedding a criminologist is not a silver bullet that, by itself, improves the multifaceted challenges faced by police departments on an ongoing basis. Rather, inviting a criminologist to work on the inside of a police department in a stable position enhances the capacity of the agency to understand and address these challenges by virtue of adding a skill set not held by other police staff. ■

Anthony A. Braga is the Don M. Gottfredson professor of evidence-based criminology in the School of Criminal Justice at Rutgers University and a senior research fellow in the Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management at Harvard University.



GETTING FIT FOR DUTY, FAST

LEO-FIT WORKOUTS ARE DESIGNED FOR POLICE

By Sgt. Nick Surre, LEO-fit co-founder

A University of Iowa research study recently examined the physical activity level of police officers in the United States. The study found the on-duty activity level of officers to be low and further linked the sedentary nature of police work and the stress of the job to increased health risks. The following article is the second in a series outlining what some police officers are doing to reduce these risks and stay healthy.

In 2013, job-related illness was the third leading cause of death for on-duty police officers in the United States, according to statistics from the National Law Enforcement Officer's Memorial Fund. Sadly, this has been a trend for the past decade.

Many law enforcement professionals struggle to find not only the time and energy to commit to a regular workout schedule, but a specific fitness program that accomplishes what the job demands of their bodies.

In order to help fight these trends, Sgt. Nick Surre (the author of this article) and Officer Craig Francis co-founded, developed and established LEO-fit.

The LEO-fit workout program is designed for law enforcement officers to build strength fast using time-specific, high-intensity workouts that require limited resources and equipment. LEO-fit also offers information on nutrition and mental health, demonstration

videos and helpful smartphone apps for fitness.

All the information on LEO-fit is free. Weekly workouts are posted each Sunday on the website. LEO-fit also tries to help motivate and encourage its followers daily through its Facebook page.

LEO-FIT CO-FOUNDERS

As a midnight shift patrol sergeant for a middle Tennessee city, I'm personally familiar with the challenges of scheduling time to exercise. Aside from the normal duties of a patrol sergeant, I also supervise the department's Honor Guard Unit and Fitness Program.

As a former athlete turned police officer, I've trained under several different fitness forms and plans, including strength and conditioning programs at the collegiate football level, and circuit training and Crossfit brand models.

I also received a certificate as a Cooper law enforcement fitness specialist and have worked one-on-one with colleagues to help them reach their fitness goals. I developed and established departmental fitness standards and tests that are relevant to being a police officer.

LEO-fit co-founder Craig Francis was also a former athlete before beginning his law enforcement career. Prior to joining the LEO-fit team, he was a typical gym junkie who spent hours in the gym training under

various traditional weight lifting programs. When his policing career began and other life demands emerged, he found it a consistent struggle to find the time to train.

Due to this challenge, Francis was willing to try a different type of training regimen. His participation was essential in the practical application and the testing of LEO-fit's validity. He's a proactive patrol officer for a city outside of Detroit, Michigan.

At the beginning of our law enforcement careers, we both struggled to find a specific fitness program that accomplished what the job demanded of our bodies. Over the next few years, we started developing our own workout plans tailored to the needs of the job. Using a combination of all the different fitness forms and plans that we'd previously used, we created a one-stop fitness program (LEO-fit) specifically designed for police officers.

Over the next year, we received many requests from colleagues, other departments and law enforcement friends for help in their fitness training regimens. Due to the popularity of the program, we discussed the idea of making the information more broadly available to the law enforcement community through a website. In January 2014, we launched the LEO-fit website and social media presence.


GETTING STARTED

The LEO-fit test was developed as a physical testing standard for determining an individual's current fitness level. It's one of the first activities that should be completed before starting the LEO-fit workout program.

The goal is to reach the highest possible level: LEO-fit. The test itself is based on the Cooper law enforcement fitness standards and establishes a single standard by giving a goal range. By doing this, it allows a natural adjustment for age and gender.

The test itself is a four-pronged assessment that focuses on four identified areas needed in law enforcement: upper body strength, core strength, lower body strength and cardiovascular endurance. In order to reach a specific level, you must meet the minimum standard in each of the four assessments.

LEO-fit co-founder Sgt. Nick Surre says police officers have specific fitness needs, which he targets on his website.



Courtesy of Sgt. Nick Surre



FIVE TIPS FOR LOSING A FEW EXTRA POUNDS

1. Download and use My Fitness Pal. This free smartphone app is user friendly and has lots of good features to help you count calories. The scan feature makes it easy to add in foods as you prepare your meals.
2. Pack your work lunches. Skip the drive-through and grab the cooler to ride shotgun with you. This makes it easier to choose healthy options that are just an arm's length away.
3. Plan a cheat day every week. If you

choose one of your days off, you can go out and eat with your family or have ice cream with your kids.

4. Drink more H₂O and less soda, energy drinks and sugary coffee. Don't waste your calories on beverages, especially those with little nutritional value.
5. Exercise, exercise, exercise. Get to a gym, go for a run, walk the dog. Do something.

Source: LEO-fit.com

The LEO-fit 100 workout program coincides with the LEO-fit test levels. This allows you to identify which current workout level you should attempt in the workout program.

LEO-FIT TEST

Start with a warm-up session as you would for a typical LEO-fit workout.

1. Do as many push-ups as possible in one minute. Rest for two minutes.
2. Do as many sit-ups as fast as possible in one minute. Rest for two minutes
3. Sprint 300 meters as fast as possible (stop watched/timed). Rest for five minutes.
4. Run one mile (1.6 kilometres) as fast as possible (stop watched/timed).

Rookie officer level

14 or fewer push-ups
19 or fewer sit-ups
67 seconds or more to complete 300 meter sprint
10:19 minutes or more to complete one mile

Police officer level

15-39 push-ups
20-39 sit-ups
66-57 seconds to complete 300 meter sprint
8:01-10:18 minutes to complete one mile

LEO-fit level

40 or more push-ups
40 or more sit-ups
56 seconds or less to complete 300 meter sprint
8:00 minutes or less to complete one mile

THE WORKOUTS

The LEO-fit program is a 25-week workout program that includes four workouts per week. Each workout has three components: warm-up, strength and workout.

Warm-up session

To help prevent injuries and to maximize your body's response to the training program, LEO-fit recommends a 10-minute warm-up prior to the strength and workout session. A suggested five minutes of walking and/or jogging, neck rotations, arm rotations, knee rotations, ankle rotations, 10 straight leg toe touches, 10 air squats, ten push-ups and any other stretching.

Strength session

The strength session is broken down into four main power lifts: back squat, standing shoulder press, deadlifts and bench press. This program follows the Windler 5-3-1 strength system, which consists of a four-week programming cycle.

Workout session

Each workout session has three different levels: rookie (beginner), officer (intermediate) and LEO-fit (advanced). All three levels have participants doing the same type of workout but altered depending on the fitness level the individual.

To get the maximum results from the workout, it's important to give your best effort. Do all the exercises as fast as possible, while keeping proper form.

Most of the workouts are performed for time, meaning you will need to run a stop watch in order to track how long the work-

out takes you from start to finish. LEO-fit also encourages you keep a journal to track weight lifted in the strength session and workout results.

Here's an example of a LEO-fit workout:

1. Warm-up session

2. Strength session (barbell back squat)

2 warm-up sets
1 set of 5 reps at 65 per cent
1 set of 5 reps at 75 per cent
1 set of 5+ reps at 85 per cent

3. Workout session

Rookie level: 3 rounds for time: 20 air-squats, 20 lunges (10 each leg) and 20 sit-ups

Officer level: 3 rounds for time: 30 air-squats, 20 lunges w/25lbs dumbbells for Men/15lbs for Women (10 each leg) and 30 sit-ups.

LEO-fit level: 3 rounds for time: 40 air-squats, 20 lunges with 35-lb dumbbells for Men and 25-lb for Women (10 each leg) and 40 sit-ups.

MAKE THE TIME

Policing can be a largely sedentary job and there isn't a whole lot we can do about changing the daily work routines or job tasks. But you can control what you eat and drink, and what you do on your downtime and days off.

No matter what workout program you're doing or what you're trying to achieve, the bottom line is that doing some activity is better than doing none. Be aware of what you eat and make yourself do physical activity every day. A 10-minute workout is less than one per cent of your entire day.

Police work comes with a ton of responsibility and officers are forced to become selfless. But they can't let their health and fitness take a back seat to all of work and life's other demands. The job is unforgiving and too dangerous for that. Officers need to keep their job and life's perspective in sight. »

FOR MORE INFORMATION,
PLEASE VISIT:
WWW.LEO-FIT.COM





LATEST RESEARCH IN LAW ENFORCEMENT

The following are excerpts from recent research related to justice and law enforcement and reflect the views and opinions of the authors and not necessarily those of the organizations for which they work. To access the full reports, please visit the website links at the bottom of each summary.

COVERED IN BLUE: POLICE CULTURE AND LGBT POLICE OFFICERS IN THE PROVINCE OF ONTARIO

Joe L. Couto

Interviews with 21 LGBT police officers suggest that the police culture in Ontario is shifting from a traditional hypermasculine, heterosexual orientation to one that is becoming more inclusive.

While participants generally agreed that police culture is still conservative and male dominated, most also agreed that it has evolved toward inclusivity over the past 20 years as more women, members of racialized groups and LGBT people are recruited and rise through the ranks.

The shift toward greater inclusivity may be being driven more by legislative requirements (laws, human rights codes) than by a substantial shift in the police culture ethos.

Participants who have been in policing for more than 15 years particularly emphasized that the greater presence of LGBT and other diverse groups in police organizations indicates a shift away from the hypermasculine, heterosexual focus of the culture toward greater inclusivity.

As raids on bars and bathhouses serving LGBT clientele have been abandoned and some police services are aggressively recruiting from LGBT communities and promoting LGBT officers into leadership positions, participants felt organizational culture is also changing, albeit in an evolutionary rather than revolutionary manner.

Some participants suggested that organizational resistance toward inclusivity in the organization centres primarily on middle managers 50 years of age and older who retain more traditional and negative attitudes toward LGBT police officers.

The perception that police organizations are moving toward greater inclusivity is subjective and influenced by the discourse

represented by the police artefacts. Artefacts such as service mottos, organizational statements, uniform and grooming regulations, and accommodation policies emphasize conservative values associated with police professionalism.

While some LGBT police officers interviewed have experienced overt discrimination and harassment in their careers, most report a greater presence of "microaggressions" in the workplace.

Participants did express concern for what they perceived as the disconnection between what organizations say (often expressed through its artefacts) and how "things really are" in the workplace.

Despite the challenges for LGBT police officers, this study found strong support among participants for policing as a profession and for their organizations in particular. All 21 participants agreed with their organization's general goals of maintaining public order and solving crimes (Colvin 2012). This indicates that policing as a profession maintains a strong ability to bind its members to its goals of law enforcement and crime prevention regardless of their personal characteristics.

CONCLUSION

This study confirms that LGBT police officers in Ontario continue to experience the influence of the traditional police culture, which has been dominated by white, heterosexual males, in their policing workplaces. But participants also believed that the culture is evolving to be more reflective of the broader society's greater acceptance of LGBT people.

Organizationally, police services are exhibiting greater sensitivity to diverse groups. However, they need to be more intentional in recognizing their LGBT police officers, as more openly LGBT police officers come into their organizations.

MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

Alison MacPhail and Simon Verdun-Jones

Research confirms that people with various forms of mental illness are highly over-represented in the criminal justice system. What isn't as clear is the exact relationship between mental illness and criminal behaviour, including violence, and how best to reduce offending in people with a mental illness who have come into contact with the criminal justice system.

While many studies have identified an apparent link between mental illness and both violence and recidivism, other research has found that serious mental illness (primarily schizophrenia and other psychoses) alone is not significantly predictive of criminal behaviour.

The more important factors are antisocial personality, psychopathy, neuro-cognitive brain impairments and substance abuse, and having antisocial associates and living in a chaotic and antisocial environment with few positive social supports.

RELATIONSHIP TO POLICE

It's clear that police time is disproportionately consumed dealing with people living with a mental illness. However a significant proportion of this is due to behaviour that is not criminal.

It may be in relation to seeking assistance in a crisis, or the behaviour may not be significant enough to justify arrest and criminal processing, but which is still viewed as problematic in the community. As well, this group consumes a disproportionate amount of health resources, through repeat visits to hospital emergency rooms and primary care physicians, as well as various other social services.

With respect to arrest, most studies seem to show that people with mental illness aren't arrested more frequently than others committing the same offences. Indeed there is some suggestion that police are less likely to arrest if they suspect a mental illness, especially if they can divert to a mental health program, and when they do arrest it is sometimes because the mental illness is not identified or suspected.

TO ACCESS THE FULL
REPORT, PLEASE VISIT:
WWW.ROYALROADS.CA



RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Ensure that diversion strategies, sentencing and case management address criminogenic factors such as antisocial personality/psychopathy and substance abuse, as well as social welfare needs, in addition to connecting offenders to appropriate mental health treatment.
2. Given the correlation between mental illness and substance use disorder, including the likelihood that substance misuse may mask a mental illness:
 - integrate treatment strategies while addressing the environmental factors such as inadequate housing and supports
 - integrate criminal justice responses, such as drug courts and mental health courts
3. Address the complex issues facing mentally disordered offenders through the use of integrated teams with members from mental health, social services and criminal justice. To ensure effective co-ordination of services, the authority to ensure access to required services should ideally reside in a single individual.
4. Particular attention needs to be paid to the specific needs of female offenders.

**TO ACCESS THE FULL
REPORT, PLEASE VISIT:
WWW.ICCLR.LAW.UBC.CA**

HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT: CHALLENGES TO IDENTIFYING, INVESTIGATING AND PROSECUTING HUMAN TRAFFICKING

Amy Farrell and Jack McDewitt

Human trafficking is a modern form of slavery in which people are coerced, tricked or forced into exploitive labour or sexual services. It doesn't always involve a person being physically bound into work through violence or moved across international borders. Psychological coercion or fraud can be used to keep a person in a position of exploitation and the trafficking can even occur in the victim's hometown.



Human trafficking victims are hidden, often in plain sight. Although victims may be in the public while engaged in work, traffickers control their ability to leave the situation.

To better understand the challenges of identifying, investigating and prosecuting human trafficking cases, we, in partnership with colleagues from the Urban Institute, reviewed a sample of 140 closed human trafficking cases and conducted in-depth interviews with law enforcement, prosecutors and victim service providers who participated in those cases in 12 U.S. counties.

In the sites studied, the overwhelming majority of all cases identified by law enforcement were sex trafficking cases (86 per cent of 152 cases). A much smaller percentage of all investigated cases of human trafficking were labour trafficking (nine per cent) or both labour and sex trafficking (five per cent). The majority of human trafficking victims identified were female (89 per cent).

PROACTIVE INVESTIGATION

Human trafficking victims are hidden, often in plain sight. Although victims may be in the public while engaged in work, traffickers control their ability to leave the situation in a variety of ways.

Some victims are threatened with violence. Some are controlled through various forms of psychological coercion, such as being deprived of food and water, having their access to information controlled, and receiving threats that their trafficker will report them to the police, to keep them in servitude.

Victims often blame themselves for their victimization. When victims in the cases we studied did come forward, they often needed a period of time to develop a relationship with a police officer or more often a victim service provider before they opened up and trusted that the police would be able to protect them.

In the cases we studied, the most frequent

method of identification of human trafficking cases was a tip (either from a community member, from a victim services organization or through a hotline call), cited in 39 per cent of human trafficking investigations. Rarely, in only 10 per cent of cases, did victims self-report their victimization to the police. In only three per cent of the cases, human trafficking was identified in response to a call for service.

Since many victims will never come forward to report their victimization, the police must develop proactive strategies to identify victims in their community. Agencies should consider adopting techniques from organized crime investigations for developing cases against traffickers. Some of these techniques could include cash flow and money laundering investigations, and analysis of real estate and business incorporation records of those who run brothels and businesses employing victims.

Additionally, the police should broaden the scope of their human trafficking investigations beyond sex trafficking.

To date, few labour trafficking cases have been prosecuted across the United States. Identifying these cases may require local law enforcement to develop partnerships with regulatory agencies, such as the state Department of Labor and municipal code enforcement agencies, to begin proactive investigations into potential labour trafficking situations in their communities. ■

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REPORT, PLEASE VISIT:
WWW.NIJ.GOV**



THE SEARCH IS ON

MISSING CHILDREN'S PROGRAM PUTS INFO IN PUBLIC'S HANDS

By Sigrid Forberg

When a child is abducted, the abductor needs two things: time and anonymity.

The Missing Children's Society of Canada (MCSC) is working with Canadian law enforcement agencies to take both of those advantages away.

It started with a question. In 2012, Amanda Pick, the organization's executive director, approached members of the Calgary Police Service (CPS) and asked how they could help bring more awareness to missing children's cases.

From that, came the Search Program, dubbed Milk Carton 2.0 by the media, a program to support law enforcement in reuniting missing children with their families.

"It touches people deeply when a child goes missing," says Pick. "I think the biggest part of our program is that we've built a technology that allows people to be involved and engages them before anything happens."

LEVERAGING TECHNOLOGY

The Search Program is a rapid-response network that uses geographically specific social media and mobile applications through push notifications to share real-time information on missing or abducted children.

Individuals and companies can donate their social media feeds and become part of an

online search party. Posts will appear on their feeds when a child goes missing near them, with details and descriptions from police, including what to look for and how to notify police if they have any pertinent information.

"The public has a role to play in missing persons investigations — they're the eyes on the road and we need to leverage that," says Insp. Carole Bird, with the National Centre for Missing Persons and Unidentified Remains. "We need to reach as wide an audience as possible."

Insp. Cliff O'Brien, with CPS, says when Pick approached him, he realized the potential of such a program for missing children investigations.

"It's a relatively simple, but very powerful tool," says O'Brien. "Like most of us, people get a hundred emails a day but a push notification goes straight to your phone, people have the information right there in their hands right away."

During their pilot phase, CPS tested the technology on a case involving a 14-year-old girl who'd run away with a violent man in his 30s. They suspected the pair may have fled to British Columbia and so they activated CodeSearch, an app-based rapid response program, in the relevant areas.

"It went viral on social media, we were

able to reach 1.3 million people," says O'Brien. "And what happened was the suspect was so paranoid because his photograph was everywhere and her photograph was everywhere that they ended up returning to Calgary and we were able to arrest him."

ADVANCING CASES

This past May, Pick brought the program to the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police (CACAP). The Search Program received a unanimous vote of endorsement and the board then asked its members to look at how they could become involved and use it to support traditional investigative methods.

Insp. Gibson Glavin, with the RCMP in Alberta, has been working with Pick to bring the program to the province. He says, so far, it's been a great tool for cases that don't meet the criteria of an Amber Alert.

"We'd be getting calls from members demanding to have a missing child put on Amber Alert," says Glavin. "But they'd be missing one or two criteria and, understandably, they'd be frustrated. This fills that gap."

The RCMP in Alberta are currently working on making its members aware of the availability of the program. It's even been written into the provincial Amber Alert policy so members will know the alternative options available to them in a timely manner.

"The longer a child is missing, the odds of getting them back to their family safely go down and down," says Glavin. "This gives us a huge leap on the timeliness of getting information out to the public."

Pick says that while it might be a lofty goal, MCSC is hoping to see an end to child abduction in Canada. And a good start to that goal is ensuring abductors are recognized and caught immediately.

"When we first started talking about putting this program together, it seemed completely overwhelming," says Pick. "But then we thought, 'What if that child's picture was everywhere? What if that abductor couldn't drive down a street without being recognized?' When everyone in the community is on the lookout — I think that's when we're going to see real change." ■

Tom Muir of RallyEngine, which developed the CodeSearch application, demonstrates the system to the media during its 2012 launch in Calgary.



Missing Children's Society of Canada